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Urbanization has dramatically altered the way in which land generates and forfeits
value. The dominant economic significance of patterns of land use and the opportunity costs of foregone complementarities have made the capacity to reconfigure
urban property essential. Yet the architecture of our workhorse tenure form—the
fee simple—is ill-suited to meet these challenges. The fee simple grants a perpetual
monopoly on a piece of physical space—an ideal strategy when temporal spillovers
loom large, interdependence among parcels is low, most value is produced within
the four corners of the property, and cross-boundary externalities come in forms
that governance strategies can readily reach. But times have changed. Categories of
externalities that were once properly ignored by the fee simple have become too
important to continue neglecting. This paper argues for alternative tenure forms
that would move away from the endless duration and physical rootedness of the fee
simple.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly all privately owned real estate in the United States is held
in fee simple absolute, or fee simple for short.1 Every law student
learns that the fee simple is the most extensive of all the estates in
land—endless in duration, unencumbered by future interests, alien1 See, e.g., JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 9.05(B)(1)
(2012) (placing the percentage of privately owned land in the United States that is held in
fee simple absolute at “[o]ver 99%”). Although the designation “absolute” is sometimes
used to distinguish the full-strength fee simple from defeasible fees like the fee simple
determinable or the fee simple subject to condition subsequent, the term “fee simple”
without any modifiers carries the same meaning and will be used in this paper.
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able, bequeathable, and inheritable.2 Behind these descriptive elements lies the implicit normative message that the fee simple
represents the endpoint of real property’s evolution, a more or less
final answer to the question of how a modern society should structure
access to land.3 This paper challenges that message.
Property is a mechanism for delivering access to resources.4 The
fee simple embodies a particular way of packaging and characterizing
that access, one that resonates with a thing-based property paradigm.5
It purports to grant a “chunk of the world”—a unique piece of the
earth’s surface and atmosphere—indefinitely to the party designated
as owner.6 This formulation provided a useful shorthand for pairing
inputs and outcomes in the mostly agrarian society in which the fee
simple developed.7 Over time, however, it has become an
2 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 214 n.7 (8th ed. 2014) (characterizing
the fee simple as “the greatest modern estate known to law”); id. at 218 (describing the fee
simple absolute as “as close to unlimited ownership as our law recognizes” and as the
“largest estate in terms of duration” which may “endure forever”); ROBERT LAURENCE &
PAMELA B. MINZNER, A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE
INTERESTS: TEXT, EXAMPLES, PROBLEMS AND ANSWERS 4 (2d ed. 1993) (“The fee simple
absolute is the most complete form of ownership recognized at common law, and . . . there
are no conditions on possession, inheritance, or survivorship. The fee simple continues
forever.”); Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252, 252 (1991)
(describing rights in the fee simple as “the nearest approximation to absolute ownership
known in our modern system of law”).
3 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1398 (1993)
(“As a group becomes literate and its lands become more scarce, its standard bundle of
private land rights tends to evolve from the time-limited and inalienable usufruct to
something like the perpetual and alienable fee simple.”); Gregory S. Alexander, Time and
Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 350–51 (1991)
(observing that Noah Webster, like many of his eighteenth century contemporaries,
regarded “the fee-simple empire” as the end of a teleological process). This view has not
gone wholly unqualified. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra at 1398 (acknowledging that “a privateproperty regime is not always best”).
4 See generally Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1471 (2013).
5 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691
(2012).
6 See id. at 1702 (“The exclusion strategy defines a chunk of the world—a thing—
under the owner’s control . . . .”).
7 The development and ascendance of the modern fee simple occurred over a series of
centuries, but the watershed event was the enactment of Quia Emptores in 1290. See, e.g.,
Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1376 n.308. This statute, which prohibited subinfeudation of fee
interests while allowing substitution, had the effect of making land holdings more freely
alienable. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 214–15. Heritability was established
earlier, although the date is difficult to pinpoint, and elements of the feudal system made
the process less than automatic. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW
49–51 (2d ed. 1986). In 1540, the Statute of Wills made the fee simple devisable as well. Id.
at 191. Entailments and other impediments to alienability were addressed over time. Id. at
89–90; see also Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its
Limits in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385 (2006) (tracing the removal of certain
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anachronistic fiction that misses most of how urban property creates
value.8
In mediating access to resources, every property system must
decide when to employ boundaries that correspond to the physical
world, when to engage in finer-grained forms of governance, and—
most foundationally—when to simply ignore resources and impacts,
effectively leaving them in the commons.9 The optimal mix of
approaches cannot be determined for all times and places; it depends
on which resources and effects are presently most economically significant.10 Granting a perpetual monopoly on a piece of physical space,
as the fee simple does, is an unbeatable strategy when temporal spillovers loom large, interdependence among parcels is low, most value
is produced within the four corners of the property (through crops or
ranching, say), and cross-boundary externalities come in forms that
governance strategies can readily reach. But conditions have changed.
limits relating to creditors in the eighteenth century). Cumulatively, these changes in land
rights contributed to a thing-based understanding of real property. See C.B. Macpherson,
The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 1, 7 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., 1978) (“As rights in land became more absolute, and parcels of land
became more freely marketable commodities, it became natural to think of the land itself
as the property.”); see also Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in 22 NOMOS:
PROPERTY 69, 73–74 (1980) (discussing the antifeudal development of a “thing-ownership”
view of property “conceived as the control of a piece of the material world by a single
individual”).
8 There have been other recent complaints about the anachronistic nature of certain
strains of property theory and doctrine. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David
Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 91, 134–35 (2015) (observing
that the work of leading property scholars Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith neglected land
use procedures of great modern significance because they “paid no attention to public law,
instead focusing on hoary common-law doctrines”); Joseph William Singer, Property as the
Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1290 (2014) (arguing that “traditional legal
doctrines governing estates in land” represent a “hypertechnical, abstruse set of rules [that]
appears removed from modern policy concerns or values and increasingly lacks any
understandable justification”); see also Macpherson, supra note 7, at 8 (concluding, based
on the rise of the corporate form and the increased role of government regulation, “that
the notion of property as things is on its way out and that it is being superseded by the
notion of property as a right to an income”).
9 Henry Smith develops the idea that property law employs a mix of governance and
exclusion strategies in Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002). The point that many impacts
are best ignored follows from Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 347, 350–52 (1967) (presenting the thesis that property
rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains from doing so exceed the costs).
For the idea that ignoring the impacts of resource-related decisions amounts to leaving
certain elements in the commons, see YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS 92–96 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining how an “imperfect delineation of
rights” amounts to “plac[ing] attributes in the public domain”). See also infra Part I
(discussing property’s choices among the three strategies of exclusion, governance, and
tolerance).
10 See generally Demsetz, supra note 9.
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We now live in a deeply interdependent society that is overwhelmingly urban. Over eighty percent of the U.S. population lives in
urban areas.11 Spatial externalities are no longer confined to problems
of wandering cattle or wafting factory smoke; rather, the relative position and aggregate configuration of urban space represents the primary way in which real property delivers and forfeits value.12 Spatially
rooted estates of endless duration deal poorly with the problem of
optimizing urban land use because they scatter everlasting vetoes
among individual landowners over the most critical source of value in
a metropolitan environment—the patterns in which land uses and
land users are assembled in space. These patterns have become too
important to ignore, but optimizing them over time requires a capacity
for large-scale revision that the atomistic fee simple cannot provide.
Holdouts—and the prospect of holdouts—routinely shut down
socially valuable shifts in land use.13 To be sure, we have the brute
force strategy of eminent domain available to rearrange things when
the loss in value associated with existing land use combinations
becomes intolerable. But far from being a complete solution, eminent
11 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Growth in Urban Population Outpaces Rest of
Nation, Census Bureau Reports (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/
releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-50.html (reporting, based on data from the 2010
Census, that “[u]rban areas—defined as densely developed residential, commercial and
other nonresidential areas—now account for 80.7 percent of the U.S. population, up from
79.0 percent in 2000”). In 1790, the figure was 5.1 percent. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION & HOUSING UNIT COUNTS 5 (1990), https://www
.census.gov/prod/cen1990/cph2/cph-2-1-1.pdf. The Census Bureau began using a new
definition of “urban” in 1950, which somewhat increased (in that year, from 59.6 to 64.0)
the percentage reported as falling in that category. Id.; see also U.S. Census Bureau,
History: Urban and Rural Areas, CENSUS.GOV, http://www.census.gov/history/www/pro
grams/geography/urban_and_rural_areas.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2016) (detailing
definitional changes over the years in the meaning of “urban”). Urbanization is a
worldwide phenomenon. See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD
URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: THE 2014 REVISION (2014), http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/High
lights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf (reporting that “54 per cent of the world’s population
resid[ed] in urban areas in 2014” and that “by 2050, 66 per cent of the world’s population is
projected to be urban”).
12 See, e.g., HUGH STRETTON, URBAN PLANNING IN RICH AND POOR COUNTRIES 38
(1978) (“Urban land gets most of its market value not from its physical nature or its
owner’s outlays, but from the presence of other people and public and private investments
around it.”).
13 Anecdotal and intuitive support for this claim is buttressed by both theoretical and
empirical scholarship. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, The Holdout Problem,
Urban Sprawl, and Eminent Domain, 16 J. HOUSING ECON. 309 (2007) (modeling how
holdouts impede development and contribute to sprawl by pushing developers to outlying
areas where parcels are larger and require less assembly); Sean M. Collins & R. Mark
Isaac, Holdout: Existence, Information, and Contingent Contracting, 55 J.L. & ECON. 793,
800–01 (2012) (finding in laboratory experiments that holdout dynamics produce failed
assemblies); see also infra note 15 (citing studies finding premiums associated with parcels
that became part of assemblies).
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domain reveals the magnitude of a problem to which it can offer only
a partial and heavily resisted response. For example, Michael Heller
and Rick Hills recount a condemnation in New York’s Times Square
that, by standard valuation methods, produced assembled land worth
as much as three times the $86 million in fair market value that was
paid for the component properties.14 Such a disparity suggests that
assemblies of fragmented urban land cannot readily be carried out
through ordinary market processes (for if they could, why would such
a large premium be left on the table?).15 Yet the tremendous public
resistance to eminent domain for economic development in the
decade following the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New
London 16 suggests that efforts to assemble land through condemnation face political barriers that are only marginally less daunting than
the holdout problems that plague private assembly efforts.
The public outrage over eminent domain speaks to a disconnect
between the dominant understanding of property and the demands of
urban land use. Property owners are led to believe that their dominion
is endless, that no one has the right to truncate their possession
without their consent. There has always been the caveat of eminent
domain in the background, but changing conditions have expanded
what was generally regarded as a minor exception into something that
is now widely perceived as an expectation-gutting threat. If the
demand for flexible reconfiguration has become the rule rather than
the exception in urban areas, we should reexamine the baseline property estate itself. We need changes that can align owner expectations
with the land use objectives of the modern metropolis, while offering
less disruptive ways to pursue those objectives. This calls for new
forms of property, I argue, ones that can relax either the endless time
horizon of the fee simple or its rigid anchoring to a particular map
point.
14 Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1468
(2008). As Heller and Hills note, this is not an isolated example. Id. at 1469.
15 Recent empirical work has investigated land assembly frictions by examining the
premia paid for parcels that were destined for assembly. See Leah Brooks & Byron Lutz,
From Today’s City to Tomorrow’s City: An Empirical Investigation of Urban Land
Assembly, 8(3) AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 69, 71–72 (2016) (finding, based on a dataset of
2.3 million parcels in Los Angeles County over the period 1999–2011, premiums of fifteen
to forty percent for parcels that subsequently became part of a land assembly compared
with land that was not subsequently assembled); Chris Cunningham, Estimating the
Holdout Problem in Land Assembly 1–2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper
No. 2013-19, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2579904 (finding,
using data from Seattle, that subsequently assembled land sold for a premium of eighteen
percent).
16 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For discussion of the political response, see generally ILYA
SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND (2015).
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The idea that property should adapt to match the ways in which
value is produced is hardly new or radical. Following Harold
Demsetz’s analysis, property should internalize externalities when
doing so is worth the cost of defining and enforcing the relevant property rights.17 A corollary to this principle is that property’s physical
and temporal boundaries—the primary technology it uses for internalizing externalities—should change if the costs or benefits of maintaining those boundaries change. And there is a long history of
property doing exactly that. When commercial air travel became an
important generator of value, the previously harmless conceit that
landowners owned to the heavens suddenly became too expensive to
countenance, and estates were revised accordingly.18
Similarly, urbanization has raised the costs and lowered the benefits of granting individual owners perpetual monopolies on rooted
fragments of space. What were once nearly stand-alone production
sites have now become integral parts of a dynamic, interdependent,
urban value-production machine.19 Markets cannot accomplish shifts
from less valuable to more valuable urban configurations because of
the need to synchronize many complementary changes at one time.
Yet the land use controls that have emerged in an effort to manage
17

See Demsetz, supra note 9, at 350.
Eric Claeys has recently questioned whether property owners ever held an absolute
right to the airspace far above their properties, suggesting instead that the ad coelum
doctrine served as “one of several heuristics” that were aimed at giving owners rights over
areas that they could feasibly put to beneficial use. Eric R. Claeys, On the Use and Abuse
of Overflight Column Doctrine, 2 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 61, 63, 79–82
(2013). Regardless, the history suggests that commercial overflights raised a question that
had to be resolved about the landowners’ rights. See id. at 62 (“No doubt, there was a
period of time when landowners, airlines, and lawyers were all genuinely in suspense about
how airplane overflights would be treated at common law.”); see generally STUART
BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? (2008) (providing a thorough history of the overflight
issue’s development and resolution). It matters little for my purposes whether one
understands the resolution of that question as a recognition of how things had always really
been or as an announcement of a change. Perhaps future generations will point to the use
of eminent domain—or even to reforms like the ones that this paper hopes to
foreshadow—as proof that the fee simple never really granted perpetual estates, but rather
only contingent ones.
19 In a sense, real property has come to more closely resemble intellectual property in
its modalities of value production, insofar as both now substantially rely on agglomeration
economies and the ability to capture interdependencies. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann &
Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 268–71 (2007) (describing spillovers
among geographically clustered high-tech firms and their positive effect on innovation).
Real property theory might therefore take a lesson from intellectual property scholars’
active engagement with the length and character of the monopolies granted. This inverts
the usual focus on what, if anything, intellectual property can learn from real property—
and the associated concern that intellectual property is too overshadowed by or beholden
to real property metaphors. See Julie E. Cohen, Property as Institutions for Resources:
Lessons from and for IP, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2015).
18
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interdependencies are not designed to facilitate these sorts of largescale coordinated moves. Indeed, they are not even well designed to
maximize the value of land uses at the parcel level.20
It is becoming increasingly evident that current methods of managing urban land use carry a tremendous opportunity cost. A recent
article estimated that “[l]ifting all the barriers to urban growth in
America could raise the country’s GDP by between 6.5% and 13.5%,
or by about $1 trillion [to] 2 trillion.”21 Unlocking the potential of
urban land requires shedding not only regulatory impediments, however, but also impediments that are built into the very fabric of our
dominant tenure form.22 To capture more value from urban land use
patterns will require creative thinking, including a willingness to
rethink the rooted, perpetual nature of standard-issue property rights.
There are two basic ways in which our current property system
falls short in meeting the challenges of the city. First, we lack good
mechanisms for coordinating the spillover-producing behaviors that
are most important to present-day urban agglomerations. Second, the
veto power granted to owners hampers the ability to reconfigure
property at a different scale or with different sets of complementary
uses. Although the two issues—coordination and configuration—are
entwined,23 my primary focus in this paper is on finding ways to overcome reconfiguration challenges. Configuration—getting the valuemaximizing combination of land uses and land users in place—is a
prerequisite to meaningful coordination efforts.24 And it is here that
the architecture of the fee simple most plainly gets in the way.
20 For example, zoning restrictions may fail to accommodate the most valuable paths of
development and may raise the cost of housing and office space by curtailing supply. See,
e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 637, 638, 645–47 (2012).
21 Space and the City, ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21647614-poor-land-use-worlds-greatest-cities-carries-huge-cost-space-and-city.
22 The two issues interlock: more regulatory freedom becomes possible when other
tools are available to address and price expectations about changing conditions. See infra
Section III.C.3.
23 Significantly, it may be difficult to know whether reconfigurations will add value if
current sets of landowners are not successfully coordinating with each other to optimize
their combined land uses. I consider the possibility that some reconfiguration tools could
double as incentive mechanisms that would lead neighboring landowners to develop more
effective methods of coordination. See infra text accompanying notes 128–30, 182–87.
24 Potential mechanisms for coordinating the behavior of neighboring urban land users
might draw on existing approaches for managing large-scale natural resources. See, e.g.,
Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level
Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507 (2015) (examining management alternatives for
landscape-level resources, from habitats to firescapes, which exist at a scale far larger than
that used for ordinary productive activities on land).
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To provoke thought, I briefly sketch two possibilities for revising
the fee simple to make it more readily reconfigurable. The first, the
callable fee simple (callable fee), is a tenure form that is made
expressly subject to a call option that can be exercised as to all properties in a designated area when particular conditions obtain.25 The
second, the floating fee simple (floating fee), would represent a geographically untethered claim on real property that would facilitate
either small-scale readjustment or longer-range relocations.26 Both
would loosen the spatial monopoly that the fee simple grants to individual landowners in urban areas.
The paper proceeds in three steps. Part I presents property as a
dynamic institution that employs a shifting mix of three strategies:
boundary exclusion, governance of spillovers, and toleration of externalities. Part II considers how we might remake property forms to
better fit the way urban landscapes produce value. Part III addresses a
variety of objections, including concerns that the ideas proposed here
would run afoul of the numerus clausus doctrine or otherwise undermine the meaning of property. In fact, the approaches I discuss could
be constructed from existing property forms—defeasible fees and
executory interests—and could be designed to support an enhanced
rather than diminished vision of ownership.
To be clear, I do not argue that the fee simple should be abolished, nor do I dispute that it will continue to be the best tenure form
in many situations. But it should not be treated as the only alternative,
nor should its costs be ignored.

25 See infra Section II.A.2. Of course, the government has an implicit call option on
everyone’s property already by virtue of the eminent domain power. See, e.g., United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 261, 272 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(observing that the United States’ “inherent condemnation power, by its very nature, is a
perpetual option to take, at any time, any property it needs”). What is contemplated here
is a more explicit option that would price in heightened vulnerability to displacement. The
“callable” terminology comes from the language of financial options. In finance, a call
option provides the right but not the obligation to purchase a particular stock or other
asset at a particular price on or by a particular date. RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 503 (10th ed. 2011). In the legal literature on
entitlements, liability rules have been equated with call options. See IAN AYRES,
OPTIONAL LAW 14–17 (2005) (reviewing development of the option analogy in legal
scholarship). The property rule-liability rule dichotomy was famously developed in Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
26 See infra Section II.B.2.
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I
ARCHITECTURE

AND

ADAPTATION

Property’s architecture has received significant scholarly attention,27 as has the proposition that property can or should adapt over
time in response to social and economic shocks.28 In this Part, I use
these ideas to lay the groundwork for a critique of the fee simple. I
start by locating the fee simple’s design choices within the framework
of architectural decisions that property must make as a general
matter. I then turn to questions of adaptation.
A.

Property Design: An Overview

Property is designed to deliver access to resources and thereby
induce investment.29 To do this, property pursues a set of strategies
for matching up inputs and outcomes. As Henry Smith has emphasized, real property characteristically proceeds by placing a boundary
around a resource and allowing those designated as owners to exclude
others from the benefit stream that is produced within those boundaries.30 By delegating control over the demarcated resource, property
allows owners to make and collect on investments or bets that play
out within that domain.31 Ideally, the boundaries would be well scaled
(in both time and space) to fit the primary activities occurring on a
given parcel, so as to at least roughly internalize the associated costs
and benefits.32
27 Henry Smith’s work is perhaps the best known in this vein. See, e.g., Smith, supra
note 5, at 1700 (“There is a basic architecture of property, and many features of property
follow from it.”). Smith conceives of property as a modular, exclusion-based system, albeit
one that is supplemented with governance mechanisms. See id. at 1702–03. Notably, he
rejects the bundle of rights understanding of property, as he has also done in joint work
with Thomas Merrill. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Property as Modularity, 125 HARV.
L. REV. F. 151 (2012) (describing the architectural claims that he and Smith have made
jointly and discussing and critiquing Smith’s modularity approach).
28 The seminal paper on this topic is Demsetz, supra note 9. See, e.g., Thomas W.
Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S331, S331 (2002) (describing Demsetz’s article as “[t]he point of departure
for virtually all efforts to explain changes in property rights”). For a recent evolutionary
account, see Lee Alston & Bernardo Mueller, Towards a More Evolutionary Theory of
Property Rights, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2255 (2015).
29 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 4, at 1498–99, 1517–18 (observing how property rights
work to grant and deny access, and discussing investment incentives); Gray, supra note 2,
at 304–05 (describing property’s role as a “gateway” for mediating access).
30 See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1753–56
(2004) (describing property’s “exclusion strategy”).
31 See id. at 1729.
32 See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1332–33 (discussing the problem of optimal scale and
its connection to boundary placement).
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As Smith recognizes, this “exclusion strategy” is insufficient on its
own to properly align incentives.33 Activities taking place within the
boundaries will often produce spillovers, both negative and positive,
for proximate others.34 Where boundaries cannot feasibly or cost
effectively be employed,35 some form of governance may be used
instead to adjust the payoffs around the edges of the property’s
boundaries.36 Zoning, covenants, and nuisance law represent common
forms of governance in the land use arena, although more complex
schemes can grant parties stakes in particular outcomes or provide
structures for collective decisionmaking.
Property law also simply ignores many positive and negative
externalities. This is as it should be; internalizing externalities is costly,
and not always worth doing.37 In some cases, internalizing an externality would not alter an actor’s behavior because her internalized
returns already cause her to pursue the most efficient course of
action—as where a polluting factory would go on polluting at the
same level if made to compensate its neighbors.38 Even in cases where
internalization would lead an actor to make a different decision, a
legal intervention may not be cost justified.39
The recipe for real property, then, comes down to combining
three strategies for managing the effects of activities on land: exclude
(through boundaries), govern (by managing spillovers around the
33 Smith, supra note 30, at 1755–57 (comparing exclusion and governance as cost
internalization mechanisms and noting the latter’s advantages where precision is required).
34 Although it is most common to think of physically proximate others, time-limited
estates can produce temporal adjacency that is also prone to spillovers. See, e.g., RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 73–77 (9th ed. 2014) (discussing temporal and
physical division of property).
35 See Smith, supra note 30, at 1756 (“Using fences to modulate complex questions of
use—such as proper grazing technique or optimal noise levels—would be prohibitively
costly.”).
36 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 1703 (observing that “spillovers and scale problems”
require that governance supplement exclusion); see generally Smith, supra note 9
(discussing interaction between exclusion and governance).
37 See Demsetz, supra note 9, at 350 (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize
externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of
internalization.”); id. at 351–52 (positing that before the fur trade became established, the
external impacts generated by open-access hunting “were of such small significance that it
did not pay for anyone to take them into account”).
38 See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA
(N.S.) 371, 373–81 (1962) (distinguishing Pareto-relevant from Pareto-irrelevant
externalities).
39 Private bargains to internalize externalities provide a possible alternative to legal
interventions if transaction costs are sufficiently low. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Even if private bargains are unavailable, however, the
costs of internalizing externalities through law may exceed the benefits of doing so. See,
e.g., Demsetz, supra note 9, at 351–52.
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edges), and tolerate (by simply ignoring externalized effects).40 Property’s best design depends on the sorts of land use activities, and
hence land use problems, that predominate in a given time and place.
B.

The Architecture of the Fee Simple

We can now examine how the design features of the fee simple fit
into the framework of strategies outlined above. This discussion will
shed light on the ways that the current structure may fail to align with
the demands of an increasingly interdependent society in which property configuration represents a crucial source of value.
1.

Exclusion

The fee simple maps onto a set of physical boundaries from which
(most) outsiders are presumptively excluded. These borders extend
laterally across the earth, and also vertically above and below it—until
they bump into other property holdings or trumping societal interests
(separately owned mineral estates, say, or airplane overflight zones).
Property lines do not just define the overall size and shape of the
parcel but also physically anchor the estate that the owner holds to
specific map coordinates. In this manner, the fee simple grants an
exclusive right to a spatially defined piece of the physical world to an
owner who can (with some exceptions) trump the claims of all others
to make use of that space.
The temporal scope of exclusion is also notable: The fee simple is
unencumbered by future interests and perpetual in duration. An
owner can undertake projects of any length she chooses and wait
indefinitely for her investments and gambles on the land to pay off.41
Her tenure (and those of her heirs and beneficiaries) is limited only by
the durability of the legal and political structures that support the
estate, and by any caveats that those same legal and political structures establish or reserve (such as eminent domain). Uninvited outsiders are not merely excluded from a time slice, but rather from the
entire temporal trajectory.
Together, these boundaries grant owners perpetual monopolies
on specific spatial locations. The fee simple thus does an excellent job
of encouraging optimal investments in outcomes that are spatially
constrained (within the parcel) but temporally extended. For example,
40 The interaction between the first two of these strategies has been expressly examined
in existing work. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 9.
41 See Smith, supra note 30, at 1729; see also FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY
AND PROFIT 370–73 [1921] (8th ed. 1957) (discussing connections between risk and
ownership, although expressing some skepticism about the need for property interests to
survive death).
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the unlimited time horizon encourages owners to make the right
choices between chopping down trees now or letting them grow into
larger trees42—at least if we assume that neither the trees nor the
chopping operations impact anyone outside of the owned parcel. In
other words, the fee simple handily internalizes the sorts of purely
temporal spillovers that historically led to dust-ups between life
tenants and remaindermen, landlords and tenants.43
By contrast, the capacity of the fee simple to contain spatial
impacts depends on the size of the holding relative to the events
taking place upon it. Thus, the prevalence of what Robert Ellickson
calls “small,” “medium,” and “large” events will inform the question
of how property should be held.44 The parcel does not have to be large
enough to contain all the impacts of the owner’s activities in order for
the fee simple to work well—some impacts can be reached through
governance mechanisms or bargains, while others can simply be
ignored. But a pervasive mismatch between the property’s scope and
the scope of the owner’s impacts calls boundary placement into question. Making boundaries too expansive can be as problematic as
making them too narrow, however. Not only must owners find a way
to manage the resources that lie inside the boundaries,45 expansive
boundaries may effectively trap resources in one owner’s hands that
would be more valuable in a number of other hands.46 In other words,
there may be diseconomies of scale as well as economies of scale.47
There can be diseconomies of scale in time as well as in space.
Because the temporal scale for human endeavors is never infinitely
42 This is a standard example. See, e.g., LEE S. FRIEDMAN, THE MICROECONOMICS OF
PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 709–12 (2002) (presenting “tree models”); POSNER, supra note
34, at 74 (explaining that a life tenant will “want to cut timber before it attains its mature
growth even though the present value of the timber would be greater if the cutting of some
or all of it were postponed”).
43 It may not do so perfectly, however. Just as a landowner’s actions may fail to account
for costs imposed on other people (externalities), her actions may fail to account for costs
imposed on later versions of herself (internalities). See, e.g., R.J. Herrnstein et al., Utility
Maximization and Melioration: Internalities in Individual Choice, 6 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 149, 150 (1993) (defining “internality” as “a within-person externality”).
44 Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1323–35.
45 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (N.S.) 386, 390–98 (1937);
Coase, supra note 39, at 16; see also Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, 2014 BYU L. REV.
1373, 1403 (2015).
46 For example, large holdings may contain excess capacity that will go to waste if it is
too costly to transact over. See Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and
the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273,
301–04 (2004) (describing excess capacity). Large property holdings could also unduly
concentrate ownership in too few hands. For some disadvantages of ownership
concentration, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061,
2094 (2012).
47 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 9, at 358.
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long, it is likely that a given property holding will later come to be
more valuably held by a different party, one who is best positioned to
oversee the endeavors on the property that will have become the most
valuable ones. As long as land is freely alienable, this seems to present
no problem; the owner simply lops off the portion of time she cannot
use herself by selling the property.48 A difficulty arises, however, if the
new use will require a larger spatial scale, because the turnover in
adjacent properties will most likely not be synchronized. Thus, the fee
simple’s lengthy temporal horizon can block the realization of new
spatial economies of scale.
This interaction follows from a key feature of boundary exclusion: the veto rights that it grants owners. Subject to some qualifications,49 the fee simple allows owners to stand on their rights and stay
rooted in place. The owner’s veto presents no difficulty when there
are many good substitutes for the property in question. But it
becomes problematic when a set of properties serve as strict complements in producing a larger economic benefit—as commonly occurs in
urban areas.
2.

Governance

The fee simple does not rely on boundary exclusion alone; a
variety of governance mechanisms exist to address cross-boundary
spillovers. Negative externalities that pass a certain threshold are
reachable through nuisance law,50 while less serious impacts are
reachable through finer-grained land use regulations like zoning and
covenants. Together, these land use controls work fairly well to deal
with spillovers that take the form of impacts—debris, noises, smells,
aesthetic effects—that literally or virtually come across the border
from a party’s on-site operations.
Positive cross-boundary spillovers have not received parallel
treatment. Only in very limited circumstances can parties be made to
pay their neighbors for undertaking acts that incidentally benefit
48 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property in Housing, 12 ACADEMIA SINICA L.J. 31,
39–40 (2013).
49 There are some circumstances in which an owner’s possession can be truncated
involuntarily. Not only can an owner lose her property in predictable ways by failing to pay
her mortgage or property taxes, she might also be dispossessed by factors like eminent
domain, natural disasters, or private lawlessness. See, e.g., John A. Lovett, Property and
Radically Changed Circumstances, 74 TENN. L. REV. 463 (2007) (examining property rights
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina); Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J.
437, 481–89 (2014) (detailing avenues through which property may be forfeited through
failure to undertake certain actions).
50 This might be either an absolute threshold, or one that is defined relative to the
utility of the activity. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 782–83.
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them.51 Yet positive externalities are less neglected than one might
conclude from reading academic treatments of the issue. Coercion is
rarely applied to the recipients of positive externalities, to be sure, but
coercion is routinely applied to producers of positive externalities.
Landowners are often required to engage in certain affirmative acts
for the benefit of those around them.52 Put differently, whenever the
failure to provide a particular benefit to one’s neighbors becomes a
large enough problem for the community, it will be recharacterized as
a harm and controlled accordingly.53
Most notably, land use restrictions often ensure that landowners
provide reciprocal positive externalities to their neighbors by
engaging in like uses. For instance, an area zoned for single-family
homes on large lots forces each landowner to contribute to the neighborhood atmosphere enjoyed by her neighbors, even as it secures
their reciprocal contributions to the atmosphere she herself enjoys.
Whether framed as controlling the negative externalities associated
with less compatible uses or as eliciting the positive externalities that
come from the specified use,54 such restrictions are designed to benefit
the neighbors.55
Nonetheless, there are some positive externalities that are difficult for existing governance tools to reach. Although there is no limit
to how bad impacts for neighbors can get and still be reachable
through land use tools, there is some practical limit to how much landowners can be required to do for each other.56 Especially difficult to
51 See, e.g., Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested
Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189, 195–98 (2009) (outlining the treatment of unrequested
benefits under current law).
52 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners: An Essay
for Tom Merrill, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 43, 50–58 (2014); Larissa Katz,
Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Private Property Rights Enhance State
Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2051 (2012); Shoked, supra note 49, at 463–91.
53 For example, refraining from emitting smoke from one’s smokestack was once
understood as the conferral of a benefit; it is now natural to think of such smoky emissions
as negative externalities. See James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 325 n.3 (1992).
54 Any externality can be described in either positive or negative terms. See id.; see also
Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135
(2014) (providing an extended exploration of this point).
55 To be sure, such a single-use scheme may not produce the most valuable synergies
among uses. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. My point here is simply that existing
land use tools can require owners to engage in uses that are thought to benefit proximate
others, and that these tools are thus not categorically inept at addressing positive
externalities.
56 Lon Fuller makes a similar point in distinguishing the duties that everyone owes
from the aspirations that individuals might strive to achieve. See LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW 27–28 (rev. ed. 1964); see also Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski,
Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
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compel are unique inputs into shared environments that cannot be
reciprocally required of all owners within a spatially proximate area.
Neighbors could in theory find ways to coordinate over these inputs
once they are neighbors, but land use law has few effective tools for
assembling together the heterogeneous land uses and land users that
might be most capable of producing valuable synergies. Urbanization
makes this shortfall increasingly consequential.
3.

Tolerance

The fee simple does not internalize all externalities, whether
through boundaries or through governance. There are some externalities that it simply tolerates. As a general matter, this is entirely appropriate and indeed unavoidable. No property form can completely
internalize all effects, because to do so would be prohibitively costly.
Moreover, externalities often turn out to be irrelevant to efficiency.57
The interesting question is whether the fee simple systematically
ignores categories of impacts that have come to have real economic
significance. If so, then we must ask whether there is any way to cost
effectively address those types of externalities.
Here it becomes relevant that the fee simple ignores two sets of
external impacts that have become increasingly important in urban
areas—one by design, and the other more contingently. First, because
the very essence of the fee simple is a perpetual spatial monopoly, the
externalities that follow from that design choice—holdout problems—
are an unavoidable part of the package. In an effort to garner more
surplus for herself, the holdout raises assembly costs (often to prohibitive levels) in ways that harm not only herself but also the would-be
assembler and others who would benefit from the assembly.58
Holdout behavior can stymie efforts to physically assemble land, as
well as other attempts to assemble complementary land users and uses
in proximity with each other.59
1781, 1803 (2015) (explaining that carrots may work better than sticks in contexts where
“upper limits to performance are hard to define”).
57 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
58 See, e.g., Thomas J. Miceli, Free Riders, Holdouts, and Public Use: A Tale of Two
Externalities, 148 PUB. CHOICE 105, 108–10, 112 (2011) (examining the holdout problem
and characterizing it as involving a “supply-side externality”); Lee Anne Fennell, Common
Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 928–29 (2004) (describing externalities
generated by holdout behavior).
59 It is helpful here to recognize that placing land under one owner’s control is only one
possible way to achieve coordination among proximate uses. What must be assembled is a
structure for coordinating resource access and use. See, e.g., Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and
Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 351–53 (1991) (giving the example of a department
store that could be seamlessly operated as a unit even if part of it were owned by a
different party if transaction costs were zero); Fennell, supra note 4, at 1529–30 (noting the
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Second, the governance mechanisms with which the fee simple is
commonly paired cannot reach certain categories of positive spillovers: those that stem from the unique, nonreciprocal contributions of
proximate land users, and that generate cumulative and often nonlinear effects. While coordination mechanisms could be devised to
reach these impacts,60 implementing them in already developed areas
requires assembling consent among the relevant proximate actors (or
employing coercion to override the lack of consent).61 Moreover, optimizing the use of such mechanisms requires first solving the configuration problem to bring together complementary land uses. For these
reasons, the holdout problems baked into the fee simple’s architecture
get in the way of governance innovations as well.
C.

Adaptation and Evolution

Property can be understood as a dynamic institution, a living
system that evolves—or at least should evolve—over time in response
to changes in circumstances that alter how resources generate value.
This raises the question of whether the fee simple has adapted, or can
adapt, to the changes that urbanization has brought about in how
property generates value.
1.

Internalizing and Uninternalizing

Following Demsetz, we should internalize externalities when (and
only when) the gains from internalization outweigh the costs of
delineating and enforcing the relevant property rights.62 Thus, when a
resource dramatically increases in economic importance (Demsetz
uses the example of fur-bearing animals) it becomes worthwhile to
internalize externalities (such as those from overhunting) surrounding
that resource.63 Property rights that had previously not been worth the
trouble of defining and enforcing become valuable enough to pay
their own way, and too costly to continue doing without.
Although Demsetz focused on the rise of private property
rights,64 his logic operates in the reverse direction as well: We should
stop internalizing externalities when the cost of internalizing them
contingent role of physical access and formal property rights in achieving the goal of
optimal resource use).
60 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace
Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 827, 834 (1999) (addressing this issue in the context of creating neighborhood
associations within established areas).
62 Demsetz, supra note 9, at 350–51.
63 Id. at 350–53.
64 See generally id.
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rises too high relative to the benefits associated with that internalization.65 To be sure, some of the costs of internalization—such as those
of defining property rights—are sunk once private property has been
established along particular lines.66 But the costs of enforcing those
rights are ongoing, and may eventually become no longer worth incurring. Of particular relevance to the discussion here is the cost of
extending property rule protection and its associated veto power to
landowners for an indefinite period of time, as the fee simple does.67
Even when internalization is cost justified, a choice remains
about how to carry it out. We must decide which aspects of resource
management will be incentivized “automatically” through boundary
placement68 and which features can be managed effectively through
governance mechanisms like taxes, subsidies, regulation, covenants,
zoning, and nuisance law. Changes in the costs of carrying out exclusion or governance strategies—whether due to changes in the scale of
activities that are typically undertaken on property, new technologies
for governing or excluding,69 or otherwise—can alter the ideal mix of
strategies.70
2. Changing Sources of Value
Legal scholars have recently begun to focus sustained attention
on the challenges and opportunities presented by increasing urbanization.71 There are a variety of mechanisms through which proximity
generates value—agglomeration economies—at various scales within
65 The idea that the Demsetzian process can “work[ ] in reverse” when the costs
associated with property rights grow too large has been noted in the intellectual property
context. Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select
Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 431–32 (2009); see also Eli M. Salzberger,
Economic Analysis of the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 27,
34–36 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (extending Demsetz’s theory to
“de-propertization”).
66 See Richard N. Langlois, The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs, 27 ORG.
STUD. 1389, 1392–93 & 1392 fig.1 (2006) (describing fixed and variable costs associated
with property rights, and noting fixed costs may be sunk).
67 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 25, at 1092 (defining property rules and
distinguishing them from liability rules).
68 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land Titles: Two Examples from
China, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 281, 284 (2012) (“When a private farmer
is entitled to keep a crop he grows, for example, he is automatically rewarded for choosing
the best crop to plant, planting at the right time, weeding, applying fertilizer, fallowing a
field when appropriate, and so on.”).
69 A canonical example is barbed wire, which dramatically reduced the costs of fencing
one’s land. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A
Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 172 (1975).
70 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 9, at S462–78.
71 See, e.g., David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1507 (2010); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive
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cities and metropolitan areas.72 A city’s or a metro area’s depth and
variety of labor markets, social scenes, and shopping opportunities
influence the value to firms and individuals of locating in the area.73
At the neighborhood or block level, combinations of shops, eateries,
bars, offices, and residences can produce localized synergies.74 There
are large literatures examining these and related effects, which I will
not attempt to summarize here.75 I will instead make two claims about
the way modern life in urban areas alters the work that property is
asked to do.
First, interdependence among landowners has made combinations or patterns of property holdings a much more important source
of property value.76 Sets of complementary uses together contribute
to a given district’s or neighborhood’s overall energy or vibe—collectively determining, for instance, whether a city’s downtown has a
lively art or music scene, whether an area counts as a tech corridor,
and whether a neighborhood is historic, eclectic, or dull. The significance of clusters of enterprises has received recent attention,77 along
with the possibility that small overlapping circles of interaction could
provide the key to understanding agglomeration’s benefits.78 Finding
ways to bring complementary land users into close proximity thus represents a primary challenge, one that I have elsewhere termed a “parExternalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2012); Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 20;
Fennell, supra note 45.
72 See Pierre-Philippe Combes & Laurent Gobillon, The Empirics of Agglomeration
Economies, in 5 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 247, 294–95 (Gilles
Duranton et al. eds., 2015); Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 20, at 638.
73 See, e.g., Gilles Duranton & Diego Puga, Micro-Foundations of Urban
Agglomeration Economies, in 4 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2063,
2086–98 (J. Vernon Henderson & Jacques-François Thisse eds., 2004) (presenting models
showing how agglomeration can increase the quality of matches and the chances of
matching in labor markets); Schleicher, supra note 71, at 1521–23.
74 See, e.g., Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 20, at 647 (distinguishing small-scale
“microagglomerations” from larger-scale agglomeration effects).
75 An influential early contribution was ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS IV.X.7–13 § 3 (8th ed. 1920), http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP
.html. Recent entry points into the literature include, for example, EDWARD L. GLAESER,
CITIES, AGGLOMERATION AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM (2008) and Duranton & Puga, supra
note 73.
76 See, e.g., LEWIS D. HOPKINS, URBAN DEVELOPMENT: THE LOGIC OF MAKING PLANS
27–28 (2001) (defining and discussing interdependence).
77 See, e.g., Aaron Chatterji et al., Clusters of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, 14
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 129 (2014); Gilles Duranton & William R. Kerr, The Logic of
Agglomeration (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21452, 2015), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w21452.
78 See, e.g., William R. Kerr & Scott Duke Kominers, Agglomerative Forces and Cluster
Shapes (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16639, 2010), http://www
.nber.org/papers/w16639; Duranton & Kerr, supra note 77.
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ticipant assembly problem.”79 To meet this challenge, we need
property rights and property forms that are good at making—and
remaking—valuable patterns of use.
The second and related claim is that urbanization has made it
much more important to reach categories of externalities that have
historically been ignored. Consider the owner’s veto power. As long
as socially valuable projects that use land as an input rarely depend on
obtaining a complete set of complementary parcels from potentially
recalcitrant owners—that is, as long as many good substitutes exist—
the owner’s nominal spatial monopoly is of little moment.80 But when
an owner’s property represents a unique ingredient for a valuable
assembly, she can exercise the veto power in socially harmful ways.
Urbanization makes complementarities among holdings an increasingly important source of value, which sharpens holdout problems.
The positive externalities associated with patterns of land use
have also become far more economically significant, while remaining
difficult to reach through traditional governance mechanisms like
zoning and covenants. Individual households and firms are part of
larger land use patterns, but internalize only a fraction of the costs and
benefits associated with their place within the pattern. When cities
were organized around the production of physical goods, traditional
land use controls could attain serviceable patterns by keeping incompatible uses separated and protecting more sensitive uses like residences. But urban areas are now less about producing goods and more
about producing ideas and consuming experiences.81 A separate-theuses strategy cannot effectively harness the positive externalities that
come from putting diverse but complementary uses together.82
Of course, many externalities are irrelevant to efficiency; actors
may do the efficient thing for their own reasons.83 If private returns
are large enough to trigger a given action, like planting a tree or
painting a house, the fact that positive spillovers benefit others will be
79

Fennell, supra note 45, at 1375, 1389–96.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Justified Monopolies: Regulating Pharmaceuticals and
Telecommunications, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103, 108–09 (2005).
81 See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., Consumers and Cities, in THE CITY AS AN
ENTERTAINMENT MACHINE 135 (Terry Nichols Clark ed., 2011).
82 The idea that mixed uses can generate benefits unachievable through single-use
zoning is most famously associated with the work of Jane Jacobs. See JANE JACOBS, THE
DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 152–77 (1961). For discussion and critique,
see, for example, NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING,
AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 49–76 (2010).
83 See Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 38, at 373–81; David D. Haddock,
Irrelevant Externality Angst, 19 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 3 (2007); see also Frischmann &
Lemley, supra note 19.
80
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irrelevant.84 Is this typically the case for the sorts of localized investments that yield agglomeration economies? The question is an empirical one, but the growing economic significance of these investments—
whether they take the form of location choices or efforts to generate
foot traffic or buzz around a given area—makes an unqualified positive answer unlikely.85 On the contrary, we might expect parties’
inability to fully capture the returns from their actions to skew incentives in ways that dampen overall urban vitality.
Thus, one interpretation of the growing significance of urban
agglomeration benefits is that positive externalities, which used to be
either largely irrelevant to efficiency or easy to capture through reciprocally enforced requirements, now take forms that render them at
once more elusive and more relevant to efficiency. At the same time,
the negative externalities associated with the owner’s veto, which can
impede valuable patterns of complementary uses, have become more
socially costly.
3.

The Prospects for Adaptation

The discussion above suggests that urbanization has rendered the
fee simple paradigm more costly and less beneficial as our default
property form. Following Demsetz, we might expect changes in property law to ensue. That we have not seen a shift away from the fee
simple might be interpreted as a failure of adaptation. But it might
also be interpreted as evidence that our property laws have in fact
successfully adapted (and will continue successfully adapting) to keep
the fee simple in fighting trim as conditions change. There is some
support for this faith in the fee simple’s adaptability.86 But there is
also some reason for doubt.
84 In these examples, note that the action in question is essentially an all-or-nothing
choice that is indivisible or “lumpy.” See Lee Anne Fennell, Slicing Spontaneity, 100 IOWA
L. REV. 2365, 2378–82 (2015) (discussing the significance of lumpiness in choices that
generate externalities); see also Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1013–19 (1992) (giving the example of a real estate agent who will
undertake an optimal step like listing a home on a multilisting service, despite receiving
only a fraction of the return from the home’s sales proceeds, if there is no way for her to do
less and still receive any return).
85 Consistent with this claim, the acts that generate agglomeration benefits in cities may
frequently take the form of continuous choices about investment levels rather than one-off
indivisible actions. A party who finds the returns to an entire lumpy action worthwhile will
undertake it notwithstanding the positive spillovers it generates, but a party deciding how
much to contribute to a social goal would be expected to contribute too little if she cannot
capture all the gains. See Fennell, supra note 84, at 2378–82.
86 See, e.g., Charles M. Haar, The Social Control of Urban Space, in CITIES AND SPACE:
THE FUTURE USE OF URBAN LAND 175, 175 (Lowdon Wingo, Jr. ed., 1963) (positing, as a
general claim “for discussion” that “the continued sway of outmoded legal institutions will
not be the cause of any irrationality in the long-run trends of urban space patterns”).
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Notably, Demsetz did not specify a mechanism for establishing or
revising property rights.87 Indeed, his account was not meant to be an
evolutionary one at all.88 In a recent paper, Lee Alston and Bernardo
Mueller explain how an approach employing evolutionary theory
might map a “fitness landscape,” and place property forms upon it
based upon the attributes they possess.89 The fittest forms—the sets of
property rights best adapted to the social and economic environment—would stand out as the highest points on this metaphorical
landscape.90 The terrain of that landscape might be “rugged” with
multiple peaks, however: Because the attributes of property are
heavily interdependent, choosing to jettison or add one feature causes
the value of other features to change dramatically.91 In this world, it is
possible to wind up at a local maximum but be unable to easily reach a
higher, but distant, peak.92 Here, “hill-jumping” rather than “hillclimbing” is required.93
Exogenous shocks can alter the relative fitness of different property arrangements, causing a different peak to emerge as the highest.94
Haar’s essay emphasizes the dynamic structure of law and argues that “this country’s legal
climate is such that any strong and persistent pressure or need will make or force
accommodation.” Id. at 176. Although he qualifies this claim, he expresses optimism about
law’s capacity to adapt and cites a number of innovations in land use controls to illustrate
his point. Id. at 176–83.
87 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 28, at S333 (observing that Demsetz’s article “said
virtually nothing about the precise mechanism by which a society determines that the
benefits of property exceed the costs”).
88 See James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 139, 142–43 (2009) (citing Harold Demsetz, Frischmann’s View of
“Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” 4 REV. L. & ECON. 127, 128 (2008)); see also
Alston & Mueller, supra note 28, at 2257 (“On close examination it is clear that Demsetz
and most of the literature that followed used ‘evolutionary’ as synonymous with change
and not to suggest a mechanism more closely associated with Darwinian evolutionary
theory.”).
89 Alston & Mueller, supra note 28.
90 See id. at 2259, 2263–64.
91 See id. at 2259, 2267–68. Such complementarity argues for making property rights
available in particular packages, given positive transaction costs. See generally Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. S77
(2011).
92 See Alston & Mueller, supra note 28, at 2259 (observing that “closely interrelated”
property bundles can create “rugged landscapes with several local peaks that can trap a
society into a suboptimal set of property rights”). A rugged landscape makes adaptation
difficult because incremental changes can make matters worse, even if large changes would
represent improvements. See id. at 2265–67.
93 See HOWARD MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION 32–36 (1987)
(discussing this distinction from evolutionary theory).
94 See Alston & Mueller, supra note 28, at 2268 (explaining that these shocks can cause
the fitness landscape to shift or “dance,” and “what was a good design may no longer be
able to deal with the new conflicts that arise and a new fitter bundle may or may not
evolve”).
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Alston and Mueller’s examples of such shocks include the demand for
beaver pelts in Demsetz’s model and the changes wrought by the
Internet.95 Urbanization represents another large shock, but one that
has come about gradually. There has been no leap to a wholly new
and “fitter” bundle but rather a series of adjustments, primarily in the
governance domain, designed around the polestar of the fee simple.
Thus, zoning and covenants have evolved, but remain unequal to the
challenges that urbanization has brought about, including the need for
reconfiguration as the efficient scale changes.
Eminent domain offers a more potent tool for addressing urban
reconfiguration challenges—one that has become both increasingly
necessary and increasingly controversial. This safety valve has
remained doctrinally open as a matter of federal constitutional law.96
But the political response to such takings has hampered resort to this
approach,97 even as the economic pressure to employ it continues to
intensify.
II
PROPERTY

FOR THE

CITY

Carol Rose once provocatively asked how our thinking about
property might change if a resource like water, rather than “immovable, enduring land,” served as “our chief symbol for property.”98 We
might similarly wonder how tenure forms might have developed had
urban agglomeration, not agricultural use, been the signal source of
land value. Property directed at optimizing synergies within cities’
prime collaboration space would likely look very different from property directed at optimizing the yield of crops or herds. Endless time
horizons might be swapped for greater flexibility in configuration.
And entitlements might focus more on coordinating co-location, and
less on physical rootedness. The sections below examine these
possibilities.

95

See id.
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (finding economic
redevelopment to be a “public use” for purposes of eminent domain).
97 See, e.g., SOMIN, supra note 16, at 135–80 (describing the political backlash against
the Kelo decision, including some of the ways in which it fell short). Even where legislative
or judicial responses did not place hard legal constraints on the use of eminent domain for
economic development, the anticipated political fallout remains a practical constraint on
this approach.
98 Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351
(1996).
96
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A. Ending Endlessness
The fee simple endures forever. This temporal feature has
received a great deal of credit for appropriately aligning incentives—
and conversely, the absence of this feature has been blamed for
holding back economic progress.99 The optimality of perpetual rights
to real property is rarely questioned, at least as a robust default.100 For
example, Ellickson describes “an infinite time-horizon” as “the economic ideal,”101 and views an endless estate as “a low-transaction cost
device for inducing a mortal landowner to conserve natural resources
for future generations.”102 Demsetz similarly explains that “an owner
of a private right to use land acts as a broker whose wealth depends
on how well he takes into account the competing claims of the present
and the future”103—an assessment that appears to be premised on an
estate of infinite duration.
1.

Escape from Foreverland

The case for reconsidering how temporal externalities are internalized turns on their relationship to other externalities that are of
skyrocketing economic significance. Once we understand an estate’s
length as one of several possible mechanisms for internalizing temporal externalities, and once we further recognize (following Demsetz) that some externalities may be too costly to internalize, it
becomes unclear why perpetual estates are necessarily the correct
length. We no longer assume that an estate of infinite physical height
is optimal, for example, even though such an estate does an outstanding job of capturing the effects, both positive and negative, of
vertical efforts undertaken on the land.104 We are, I suggest, in a similar situation when it comes to the agglomeration benefits of cities,
which are difficult to realize in a system that uses as its basic building
block an estate of perpetual duration.
99 See generally Ellickson, supra note 68 (critiquing complex land tenure arrangements
in China that feature future interests, on the grounds that they interfere with efficient land
use and investment).
100 See id. at 284 (noting the possible advantages of voluntarily chosen temporal splits
that would shift risk).
101 Id. at 293.
102 Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1368.
103 Demsetz, supra note 9, at 355.
104 See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1363 (discussing shifts in “vertical boundaries” after
“aircraft opened access to the skies, and mechanized drilling and mining equipment, to the
subsurface,” both of which “pose an efficient-boundary problem in the vertical
dimension”) (footnote omitted); Gray, supra note 2, at 253 (“[F]ee simple ownership
cannot possibly confer on the modern landowner a limitless domain over the vertical
column of airspace grounded within the territorial boundaries of his or her realty.”).
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This is not to lightly dismiss the advantages of building into a
property form an automatic method for internalizing purely temporal
spillovers from one period to the next. If we could costlessly keep this
feature as standard equipment for property holdings, doing so would
be sensible. The problem is that it does carry costs, and those costs are
rising, even as the associated benefits are diminishing. Ellickson made
an analogous (if opposite) point in discussing the Chinese custom of
dian, which granted a seller of land and his heirs the right to repurchase the property much later at the original sales price.105 As
Ellickson explains, “In a pre-commercial society, as opposed to a commercial one, non-waivable redemption rights have fewer costs and
greater benefits.”106 We might similarly say that the fee simple’s infinite duration carried fewer costs and produced greater benefits in the
low-density agrarian society for which it was designed than it does in
today’s thoroughly urbanized society.
What was needed then was an estate that was temporally lengthy
but spatially well-scaled to contain routine “small events” like growing
crops,107 and to facilitate easy negotiations among close neighbors
about “medium events,” like whether to dam a river.108 What transpires in metropolitan areas today is a deeply interdependent and
ongoing mega-event. Relaxing the assumption that estates must be
perpetual as a matter of course offers new ways to address these largescale effects. Time-limited estates are not new phenomena,109 nor are
arrangements keying the length of a property interest to surrounding
conditions or to the owner’s own use patterns.110 There is room to
think creatively about how to adapt these models for the urban
context.
This is not to throw all concerns about temporal spillovers by the
boards. We already deal with spatial spillovers through extensive sets
of land use controls, not by mandating land holdings that are
105

Ellickson, supra note 68, at 281.
Id. at 294.
107 Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1325 (illustrating a “small event” with the example of
growing a tomato plant).
108 See Demsetz, supra note 9, at 357–58 (using the example of dam construction to
explain how private ownership can reduce the costs of transacting over decisions with
localized cross-boundary effects); Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1330–31 (discussing Demsetz’s
dam construction example as a “medium event”).
109 For a recent comparative survey of such property interests, see generally TIMELIMITED INTERESTS IN LAND (Cornelius van der Merwe & Alain-Laurent Verbeke eds.,
2012).
110 For example, entitlements to water may be lost if the water is not put to beneficial
use. See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An
Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 655–56 (2008) (discussing “use it or
lose it” character of certain water rights).
106
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extremely large physically. Similarly, there are ways to address temporal spillovers other than through infinitely lengthy estates. Historically, the law of waste and later the trust fulfilled this role,111 and the
trust model might be adapted to meet the challenge of managing multiple spatial and temporal scales in urban areas. Bonding mechanisms
might also be employed to address more frequent turnover cycles.112
Finally, it is worth observing that the problem of temporal spillovers is
not perfectly solved even by the fee simple; the fee simple can and
does generate moral hazard when owners can avoid taking responsibility for negative-value properties.113
2. The Callable Fee
There are many ways that innovative time-limited estates might
be developed, and my hope is that this paper will spur interest in
exploring them. To fix ideas, however, consider the possibility of a
callable fee—a possessory estate that is subject to a call option after a
given interval if certain conditions are met.114
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the fee simple already is
a callable fee.115 The eminent domain power enables the government
to truncate the fee simple at will upon payment of just compensation,
provided that the taking is for a public use. Because economic redevelopment counts as a public use—at least under the U.S.
111 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 239–43 (discussing the history and
scope of the doctrine of waste); POSNER, supra note 34, at 74–76 (explaining how the trust
has largely supplanted the doctrine of waste in addressing the problems of temporally
divided ownership).
112 For example, permission to construct a building could be conditioned on posting a
bond that would cover the costs of demolishing the building if it later fell into disrepair. See
T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of Spatial
Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 346 (1990) (discussing potential use of bonds to address
costs of abandonment).
113 The fact that owners are unable to unilaterally divest themselves of legal ownership
does not prevent them from imposing costs on others if, for example, they can transfer the
property to someone who is insolvent. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to
Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 401 (2010). For a recent example, see Matthew Walberg
& Ted Gregory, Tax Buyer Deeds Abandoned Properties to Homeless Man, CHI. TRIB.
(Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-homeless-property-owner-met20151025-story.html (reporting on the transfer of several properties to a homeless man by
a property investment firm that faced lawsuits filed by the City of Chicago seeking to
require it to rehabilitate the properties or pay for demolishing them).
114 See supra note 25 (defining call options). Other scholars have previously explored
the idea of subjecting property in various contexts to implicit or explicit call options that
would be held and exercised by private parties. See, e.g., Benito Arruñada & Amnon
Lehavi, Prime Property Institutions for a Subprime Era: Toward Innovative Models of
Ownership, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 29–34 (2011); Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 517 (2009); Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other
Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771, 778–83 (1982).
115 See supra note 25.
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Constitution116—the kinds of reconfigurations necessary to optimize
urban agglomerations can be legally achieved through eminent
domain. Political limits on the use of eminent domain may be much
tighter than legal restrictions, however, often rendering this course of
action unduly costly or unavailable. An expressly callable tenure form
could address this gap, while reducing reliance on a form of government coercion that many view as unusually damaging and unfair.
Consider the following example. Suppose that in an economically
distressed city like Detroit the government (or a land bank) comes to
own an assemblage of contiguous properties, say fifty single-family
home lots.117 The immediate concern is likely to be with economic
revitalization of any form—getting someone to take responsibility for
the properties and do something (anything!) with them. But the
longer range optimal use of the property may be scaled and configured differently than whatever use emerges at the present time.
There is, in this context, option value associated with holding onto the
full set of properties as a block, given the prospect of valuably
redeveloping the area in a different configuration or at a different
density in the future.
However, it may be costly to the community to have land
standing vacant for an indeterminate period. Moreover, there may be
no investor who is interested in taking on the buy-and-hold role given
uncertainty about the future regulatory environment. The callable fee
offers an alternative: Individual lots in the area could be made available to private buyers for development or restoration as home sites or
small businesses, but conveyed subject to a call option that would
facilitate the later reconsolidation of the block for reconfiguration or
rescaling of uses if specified “trigger conditions” occur after a specified amount of time has passed.
116 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954). Some states have adopted stricter standards for public use, whether
legislatively or judicially. See, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 781–83
(Mich. 2004) (specifying the circumstances in which the Michigan Constitution’s public use
requirement will be met where land is condemned for transfer to a private party); SOMIN ,
supra note 16, at 141–66, 181–203 (discussing and critiquing legislative and judicial
developments at the state level post-Kelo).
117 I assume this “unified ownership” starting point here for ease of exposition, but
there are in fact tools short of eminent domain that could help consolidate land in
distressed areas. See James J. Kelly, Jr., A Continuum In Remedies: Reconnecting Vacant
Houses to the Market, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109, 128–38 (2013) (discussing
potential for approaches like tax foreclosure and code enforcement through superpriority
liens to address problems of fragmented distressed land). Of course, it would often be
desirable to establish callable fees in areas where ownership is currently fragmented and
likely to remain so—a condition that introduces some additional considerations to be
addressed below. See infra Section II.C.2 (addressing transition issues).
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A local government would begin by designating one or more
“callblocks” in the area. These callblocks would not necessarily correspond to city blocks, but rather would be aggregations of property of
sufficient scale and contiguity to accommodate major future redevelopment efforts.118 The goal would be to identify relatively self-contained modules119 that could be repurposed in the future without
slicing into important indivisibilities (such as tight-knit neighborhoods) in surrounding areas.120 Properties within these callblocks
would be sold subject to a call option. These call options would make
each new possessory owner subject to having her property repurchased later, along with the other properties in the callblock, at a price
to be established through a fixed methodology (the strike price), after
a specified interval has passed (such as ten or twenty years), if certain
verifiable conditions obtain (trigger conditions). The trigger conditions would be principally designed to identify scale mismatches
between the evolving needs of the urban area and the land uses occurring within the callblock, but could also build in distributive considerations and other normative objectives. For example, the efficient scale
of use might shift in a given area due to population changes, which
could generate demand for more (or less) density, certain changes in
infrastructure, changes in housing stock, and so on—all of which are
difficult to carry out without a larger-scale reconfiguration. Thus, a
trigger condition might be significant population changes that are not
matched by commensurate densification (or de-densification) within
the callblock. Other trigger conditions might include underperform118 The boundaries of the callblocks could be informed both by crowdsourced
information about perceived community boundaries and by market research into the range
of scales and configurations likely to be most valuable for redevelopment going forward.
119 The sort of modularity I have in mind here is related to but differs from Henry
Smith’s. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 2097, 2115–16 (2012). Smith focuses on modularity as an attribute of property itself,
with each piece of property operating as an opaque module with certain standardized
attributes that facilitate interaction. My analysis focuses on how sets of complementary
uses form larger-scale units that might be addressed as such. See Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy
Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1978–84 (2012) (recasting key debates among property
scholars as disagreements about the scale at which to assess and pursue complementarity).
120 Another concern with defining callblocks is that some properties may exhibit strong
complementarities with spatially distant properties, as is the case with pipelines or
franchises. The analysis here focuses on the potential for callable fees to unlock
complementarities associated with spatial proximity on the assumption that these are likely
to be the most powerful complementarities in urban settings. If the most economically
significant complementarities are instead between spatially scattered properties, efforts to
harness local synergies must be designed to avoid disrupting these further-flung
complementarities. I thank Tony Casey for discussions on this point. Property disputes
frequently involve such choices about which set of complementarities to prioritize. See
Fennell, supra note 119, at 1990–92 (discussing choices among competing assemblages).
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ance of the callblock as a whole on pre-established metrics (property
value declines, residential density shortfalls, housing affordability, and
so on), relative to the surrounding region.
The options themselves could either be retained by the government or (more likely) sold as a block to a private developer. The
developer could choose to exercise those options, if and when the relevant conditions were met, upon paying the specified strike price to
the holders of the possessory estates.121 If the developer chose to exercise the options, she would be required to do so with respect to the
entire callblock on an all-or-nothing basis.122 This would help to
ensure that the repurchase would be prompted by changes in the efficient scale of development rather than by a desire to cherry-pick particular properties that have become more attractive. Once the call is
exercised and the strike price is paid to the owners, the property
would be turned over to the developer in accordance with an established schedule, allowing a reasonable period for transition.
The land at this point would be reconsolidated. The developer
could then resell individual parcels, typically after undertaking largescale redevelopment, but these sales would again be in the form of
callable fees.123 The options associated with the callblock would be
kept intact as a unit, either to be retained by the same developer, or
resold as a block to another private or governmental party. This would
make it possible to again reassemble the callblock in the future, for
further redevelopment. The government could redraw the boundaries
of the callblocks at a later date based on long-term predictions about
changes in efficient scale or configuration. But until it did so, the associated options would be maintained as a unit, enabling the entire
module to be serially redeveloped.

121 Of course the developer would not be obligated to do so. The essence of an option is
that it provides the right, but not the obligation, to do something—here, to engage in a
repurchase on specified terms. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 25, at 503–05.
122 In this sense, the callblock setup would produce a kind of forced ownership—the
option holder must take the entire block if she chooses to engage in a repurchase at all. See
Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1297, 1356 (2014) (discussing bundles
offered on an all-or-nothing basis as examples of forcings); see also Gary D. Libecap &
Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS
OF PROPERTY LAW 257, 286 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (discussing the
analogous point that a rectangular parcel system has the effect of “making the buyer take
the good land with the bad”).
123 Resale of individual parcels within a particular period could be a required part of the
overall scheme, if one of the goals of this approach is to keep land in many hands rather
than consolidated in those of a single owner.
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3. Design Considerations
The callable fee sketched above is only one model for limiting the
temporal scope of property holdings. It has two principal design
advantages over alternatives like the life estate or a term-of-years
leasehold. First, it enables a synchronized change in use for a group of
adjacent properties. Such a simultaneous shift among complementary
parcels is essential for large-scale reconfiguration in urban areas, and
indeed is the very reason that eminent domain is used even in areas
where individual properties may turn over fairly frequently. Second, it
contemplates a contingent shift in ownership. The conditions placed
on the exercise of the call option could be designed to foster more
robust investment incentives and freer alienability than would typically be associated with a life estate or term of years.124
Of course, the callable fee is not a single approach but rather a
family of possibilities with a number of moving parts—strike prices,
time intervals, and trigger conditions. These design choices raise a
bevy of important and interesting issues that I can only briefly touch
on here.125 The strike price would determine the amount of compensation that the owner of the possessory estate would receive if the call
option were exercised. As in the eminent domain context, compensation levels must balance the moral hazard of wasteful overdevelopment in the shadow of compensated takings against the costs of
124 See, e.g., Raffaele Caterina, Setting the Scene, in TIME-LIMITED INTERESTS IN LAND,
supra note 109, at 3, 4 (discussing alienability difficulties associated with time-limited
estates, and especially with life estates). The content of the conditions required for
exercising a call, including the method of computing compensation, would determine the
effects on investment incentives and alienability prospects for a callable fee. Cf. Taisu
Zhang, Property Rights in Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and the Relative Decline of PreIndustrial China, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 129, 181–86 (2011) (discussing investment
incentive and alienability differences between English mortgages and the more openended post-sale right of redemption available in China).
125 For example, one intriguing possibility would be to allow strike prices to be set by
those against whom they are to be exercised, with the self-assessed value serving as a basis
for both taxation and compensation. There is an extensive and still-growing literature on
this approach. See, e.g., T. Nicolaus Tideman, Three Approaches to Improving Urban Land
Use 52–69 (May 22, 1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file
with the N.Y.U. Law Review); Levmore, supra note 114, at 779, 784–90; Lee Anne Fennell,
Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1471–81 (2005); E. Glen Weyl & Anthony
Lee Zhang, Ownership of the Means of Production 3–4 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. CoaseSandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 765, 2016), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2744810; Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Property Is Another Name for
Monopoly: Facilitating Efficient Bargaining with Partial Common Ownership of Spectrum,
Corporations, and Land (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 772, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=28184
94. While existing analyses assume that self-assessment would occur at the level of the
individual owner, the idea could be extended to enable owners within a callblock to set a
collective strike price, applicable to an all-or-nothing call.
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underinvestment that might be associated with anticipated undercompensation.126 Owners who voluntarily purchased callable fees could
price in the expected costs of any particular compensation scheme, but
compensation protocols could be consciously designed with incentives
in mind.127
For example, a certain degree of undercompensation, coupled
with appropriate trigger conditions, could powerfully catalyze cooperative behavior among neighboring landowners to stave off calls by
keeping those conditions from coming about. As important, designated callblocks might draw together those who are best positioned to
engage in cooperative action with their neighbors to achieve the specified performance measures. This outcome would be a double-edged
sword, however, as some collective neighbor behavior can be harmful
and exclusionary. The trigger conditions (and surrounding regulatory
regime) must be formulated with care to channel collective action in
socially desirable directions.128
An analogy might be drawn to beneficial use requirements in
water law, and other “use or lose” rules applied to property interests.129 These too extend a kind of call option on underutilized prop126 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation
Be Paid? 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984) (discussing and modeling the incentive effects of
different approaches to compensation and emphasizing potential moral hazard problems);
William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on
Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1988)
(revisiting and examining Blume et al.’s arguments and incorporating Frank Michelman’s
“demoralization costs” into the analysis); see also Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract,
and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 20 (1985) (“When
government action is likely to be judged a taking, private property owners externalize the
risk associated with improvements the value of which may be destroyed by the government
action.”).
127 An interesting line of work has considered how express options might improve
incentives for landowners and the government in the eminent domain context. See, e.g.,
Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 126, at 274–75 & n.12 (discussing the possibility that the
government could acquire options to compensate only for land and not buildings, and
citing work on this alternative); Cooter, supra note 126, at 22–23.
128 See infra text accompanying notes 190–91 (discussing how trigger conditions for
callable fees might be combined with mechanisms for reducing investment risk to shift the
incentive structure facing homeowners). To the degree that trigger conditions lie outside
the control of the owners, there will be a correspondingly reduced capacity to resist
displacement. For discussion of distributive implications, see infra Section III.C. As always,
there are concerns about whether the government would have both the correct incentives
and the correct information to set conditions appropriately. Yet this is not a problem
unique to this proposal; the status quo already features pervasive governmental action (via
land use controls and other measures) that powerfully channels behavior in particular
directions.
129 See, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 110, at 655–56 (examining use or lose
requirements); Singer, supra note 8, at 1317–18 (noting antecedent forms of conditional
property, from homesteading requirements to adverse possession); see also Shoked, supra
note 49, at 481–89 (discussing property duties enforced through forfeiture); Xiaoxue Zhao,
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erty. The difference here is that keeping or losing a callable fee
depends not just on the individual owner’s actions, but rather on the
actions of all the owners within the callblock, as those actions interact
with each other and with surrounding conditions.130 At its best, a tool
for easing reconfiguration might double as a diagnostic for determining when reconfiguration is really necessary and as a prompt for
private experimentation in small-scale urban cooperation. Private
innovations, devised in the shadow of a potential call, could in some
cases obviate the need for redevelopment altogether.
Establishing callable fees in certain sectors of the city would also
induce self-selection among potential owners based on preferences for
length and security of tenure.131 Option periods for different blocks of
properties could be staggered to create a ladder effect, so that at any
given time some blocks of property within a city would be coming
online for renewal while most areas would be relatively immunized
from redevelopment.132 The risk of the property being called would be
priced into the value of the property, as would the potential for
nearby development that would enhance the value of the property.133
Owners who wanted a higher level of security could buy in an area
where fee simples remain available, or choose callable fees in a district
unlikely to be redeveloped soon (where the price would be accordingly higher).

To Reallocate or Not? Optimal Land Institutions Under Communal Tenure: Evidence from
China (Jan. 8, 2016) (unpublished working paper available at https://sites.google.com/site/
xiaoxuezhao/research) (analyzing the effects of a system of periodic land reallocation that
is tied to households’ agricultural labor).
130 To the extent that outcomes lie within the owners’ collective control, the
arrangement might in some respects resemble group liability, which can incentivize certain
mechanisms of intragroup control—for better or worse. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson,
Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 378–91 (2003) (explaining how group sanctions
can leverage and build solidarity while carrying the potential for unwanted side effects
such as excessive levels of control); see also id. at 391–94 (discussing how the existence of a
group sanction can create pressures toward sorting in group composition).
131 Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORT L. 1 (2011) (proposing
mechanisms that would allow property owners to voluntarily downgrade some of their
entitlements from property rule protection to liability rule protection).
132 Of course, the government cannot bind itself to not exercise eminent domain. But a
widespread system of callable fees might be expected to concentrate redevelopment along
the political path of least resistance—the exercise of call options—rather than through
coerced redevelopment elsewhere.
133 Cf. Sebastien Gay & Nadia Nasser-Ghodsi, Guarding the Subjective Premium:
Condemnation Risk Discounts in the Housing Market, 89 TUL. L. REV. 79, 84–93 (2014)
(suggesting that property values are sensitive both to condemnation risk and to the
potential gains of nearby condemnations leading to redevelopment).
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Buyers must already make such calculations to some degree: An
expanding city can thwart plans and even render property useless,134
and eminent domain poses more of a threat to languishing areas than
to thriving ones. The callable fee would add transparency to the mix.
B.

Rethinking Rootedness

The fee simple’s endlessness impedes reconfiguration because of
the monopoly power it confers. A different tack to take in defusing
that power would involve untethering the estate from its geographic
footprint. Interestingly, a major conceptual component of this
approach is already in place: Under Anglo-American law, an “estate
in land” is viewed as something separate and distinct from the land
itself.135 Anchoring that estate to a particular geographic position
might seem like an important and obvious move, but it turns out to be
deeply contingent.
1.

Assessing Anchoring

Consider what the geospatial anchoring of estates accomplishes.
It allows trade to proceed over not just the abstract dimensions of a
piece of property but also its unique qualities (soil, minerals, water
features) and topography. Anchoring establishes continuity of possession over the physical attributes of the land, thereby internalizing the
effects of acts on the land. Trees are rooted (literally) and present the
owner with the choice between chopping now and chopping later.
Crops are anchored in space, so owners must reap where they sow.
Cattle are not immobile, but their grazing imposes costs that an owner
of both pasture and cow is in the best position to trade off against the
benefits. Physical mooring seems essential in all of these contexts. It is
also simply a convenient way to demarcate what is owned; there has
historically been little need to make things more complex.
As these examples suggest, physical rootedness is most valuable
when the land itself is the repository of an owner’s investment efforts
and the place where returns from those efforts must be collected.136
134 See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding a municipal
ordinance banning brickyards in certain city areas, despite its devastating effect on the
value of petitioner’s land, which had long been used for brickmaking).
135 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 217 (“Instead of thinking of the land
itself, the lawyer thinks of an estate in land, which is imagined as almost having a real
existence apart from the land.”); Caterina, supra note 124, at 4 (“English law . . . divorced
ownership from land itself and attached it to an imaginary thing called an estate . . . .”).
136 It follows that unrooted or floating estates introduced under these conditions could
present significant incentive problems. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1393–94
(discussing how repartitional communes in which land was redistributed periodically might
be expected to produce incentive problems around land improvement and conservation,
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And rootedness is least costly when there is little anticipated need for
reconfiguration. Urban landscapes flip this equation. In cities, it is the
relative spatial position of real property, not the land itself, that principally accounts for a parcel’s value. At the same time, the ability to
reconfigure holdings and rescale uses represents a primary source of
value.
It might seem that immobile structures (commercial, residential,
industrial) also require continuity of geographic location. After all,
they are costly to construct and often tailored for a particular user (or
become so over time). But the need for geographic continuity
becomes more contingent to the extent that buildings of a certain type
are either fungible with each other or capable of replication in (or
transport to) new positions. Although structures are costly to destroy
and rebuild (or move), the cost may at times compare favorably to
that of alternative ways of reclaiming prime urban land for a highly
valued purpose. Currently, there is no method short of eminent
domain to accomplish cost-effective rearrangements. Loosening the
connection between estates and geographic coordinates could offer an
alternative.
2.

The Floating Fee

To spur thought about the form such an untethered estate might
take, consider the possibility of a floating fee. Under this model, the
estate in land that an owner holds is not immutably moored to a fixed
set of geographic coordinates, but instead represents a portable claim
over equivalent property. Although the idea sounds unusual, it is not
without antecedents, both in the literature and in practice.
An important example is found in land readjustment, which has
been used in limited ways in the United States and more extensively
in a number of other countries.137 Many variations exist, but the core
idea can be illustrated with an example. Suppose a low-density residential area on the edge of an expanding urban center would be more
valuably reconfigured into a higher density mix of housing, retail, and
parkland. After the relevant procedures are engaged for triggering the
readjustment mechanism, the area would be redeveloped, with
residents receiving equally valuable property within the redevelopand observing some ways that these risks may have been mitigated in the Russian
repartitional commune, the mir).
137 See generally A NALYZING L AND R EADJUSTMENT : E CONOMICS , L AW , AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION (Yu-Hung Hong & Barrie Needham eds., 2007) (describing and
analyzing a variety of land readjustment approaches).

December 2016]

FEE SIMPLE OBSOLETE

1491

ment area.138 Although the post-redevelopment holdings would be
smaller and would occupy different spatial footprints than before, the
redevelopment would have rendered the residents’ new property at
least as valuable as the old.139
While land readjustment can be pursued legislatively without
resort to a floating fee, designating property in this way would allow
people to opt into districts that are designed to be subject to such
redevelopment. As with the callable fee, this could induce useful selfselection. A number of details would have to be hashed out: the initiation procedures, the way in which equivalent land is defined, and cashout procedures for those who do not want the in-kind compensation.140 But the fact that this approach offers displaced residents a
continuing place in the community is an appealing feature, and one
that aligns with an understanding that co-location, rather than location per se, is the primary source of urban value.141
3. Of Property and Portability
While land readjustment offers the most concrete and fully conceived model for a floating fee, there are many other ways that
untethered property might operate. A range of existing portable
claims—housing vouchers,142 vacation timeshares,143 continuing-care
138 See Yu-Hung Hong, Assembling Land for Urban Development, in ANALYZING
LAND READJUSTMENT, supra note 137 at 3, 23. The residents would also have an option to
sell their land. See id. Under some models, the displaced parties instead receive shares of
the new development or a right to buy “an equivalent housing unit.” See id. at 24.
139 Id. at 23.
140 These features are already addressed in existing models for land readjustment. See
generally ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT, supra note 137.
141 For recent work focusing on the significance of co-location, see, for example, Lee
Anne Fennell, Co-location, Co-location, Co-location: Land Use and Housing Priorities
Reimagined, 39 VT. L. REV. 925 (2015); Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 20; Schleicher,
supra note 71, at 1509–10, 1515–29.
142 Housing Choice Vouchers (commonly known as Section 8 vouchers) offer portable
claims on eligible housing. See, e.g., Andrew Jordan Greenlee, A Different Lens:
Administrative Perspectives on Portability in Illinois’ Housing Choice Voucher Program, 21
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 377 (2011) (examining impact of program administration and
design on the mobility outcomes of households receiving vouchers).
143 The timeshare concept encompasses a variety of ownership forms, but has generally
evolved from the purchase of a fixed week at a fixed location to an interest that can be
used at different times at different locations. See, e.g., ADRIAN H. PRYCE & CHRISTIAN
BRUÈRE, TIMESHARE: COMING OF AGE 27, 38 (1999) (describing “external” timeshare
swaps for weeks at different locations, and “points-based systems” that add greater
flexibility); Elizabeth A. Cameron & Salina Maxwell, Protecting Consumers: The
Contractual and Real Estate Issues Involving Timeshares, Quartershares, and Fractional
Ownerships, 37 REAL EST. L.J. 278, 285–87 (2009) (describing types of timeshares);
Atupele Powanga & Luka Powanga, An Economic Analysis of a Timeshare Ownership, 7 J.
RETAIL & LEISURE PROP. 69, 69–74 (2008) (describing and examining evolution of the
timeshare industry); Membership 101, DISNEY VACATION CLUB, https://
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retirement communities,144 and so on145—offer models that might be
adapted or mined for transferable lessons (or cautions). While these
examples currently operate within special purpose spheres, it is possible to imagine bringing portable claims more squarely into the heartland of real property holdings.
Entrepreneurs and commentators have already made some forays
along these lines. An enterprise called Kasita has recently attracted
attention for its plan to develop portable microhomes that will be
designed to slide interchangeably like drawers into and out of complexes in a number of cities.146 But one need not create units that are
capable of being physically shipped across the country to carry out a
similar plan.147 Richard Florida has suggested households could seamlessly shift among sets of similar rental homes.148 Although leaseholds
might initially seem better suited to this approach than freeholds, a
mobile version of homeownership coupled with portable mortgages is
not beyond imagining.149
disneyvacationclub.disney.go.com/membership/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2016) (providing
information on a type of vacation timeshare that can be used at any of a number of
different properties).
144 See, e.g., Ellen Graham, To Move or Not to Move?, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2009),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204333804574159582221794994 (describing
continuing-care retirement communities in which seniors can move to different types of
housing units as their needs change).
145 One intriguing short-term portable claim is one’s position in a queue. See Kevin
Gray, Property in a Queue, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 165, 175 (Gregory S.
Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2010) (“The queuer holds, in effect, a kind of
mobile property in land, a portable space that is uniquely and recognizably his or hers and
is defensible against all comers.”). The queue illustrates well how a portable claim over
property might be defined functionally based on its ability to provide proximity to
transactions, rather than based on its correspondence to a fixed map point.
146 See Matt Johnston, These Ingenious Tiny Homes Move with You from City to City,
TECH INSIDER (Oct. 7, 2015, 4:22 PM), http://www.techinsider.io/tiny-smart-homes-move2015-10; see also KASITA, https://kasita.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
147 Indeed, the fact that so-called “mobile homes” are rarely moved from their initial
location might suggest that there is little demand for physically relocating structures from
place to place.
148 RICHARD FLORIDA, THE GREAT RESET 176–77 (2010) (describing his vision of
“plug-and-play housing”). Florida sees this approach as an extension of existing models,
such as the flexible extended-stay rental model employed by AVE Korman Communities.
KORMAN COMMUNITIES, http://www.kormancommunities.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
See also JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS 32, 128 (2000) (describing office “hoteling”
and vacation timeshare arrangements that feature customized preparation of spaces for
temporary occupants, with details like digitized family photos on the desk and favorite
foods in the refrigerator).
149 Some limited examples of portable mortgages have appeared in the United States,
but the idea has not taken hold; they are somewhat more common in other countries. See,
e.g., Jeffrey Lubell, Housing More People More Effectively Through a Dynamic Housing
Policy, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., at 28–29 & n.64 (Dec. 2014), http://cdn.bipartisanpolicy
.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/BPC_AbtAssociates_Housing_Paper.pdf (describing the
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Suppose, for example, that a set of homes distributed throughout
a metro area were designated as “floating estates.” Although buyers
would choose a specific home as usual, they would purchase not the
home itself but rather a portable claim equal to their investment—one
that would grow as they built up equity or as improvements to the
home were made that enhanced its value.150 At designated intervals or
on their own initiative, owners of these estates could bid to shift their
claim by moving to another home within the system, dependent on
availability.151 A portable mortgage could be shifted to the new property at the time of the move and differences in the value of the old and
new home could be paid or received. The entire system could be managed by a governing body akin to a homeowners association, with the
relevant community consisting not of a group of contiguous property
holders but rather scattered holders of claims within a floating estate
system.
Holders of these floating estates might also be made vulnerable
to a shift to a different home in the event of a change in land use in
the immediate area. For some, the ability to initiate seamless moves
would mitigate or counterbalance the risk of a possible involuntary
displacement, especially if meaningful choice about the destination
home were made possible by the many voluntary moves of others.
Those undergoing involuntary shifts could be provided guarantees
with respect to proximity and other features (along with a put option
to simply exit the system and receive fair market value).152 Groups of
residents could be guaranteed moves that would relocate them as a
cohesive unit, preserving intragroup proximity and assuring continued
co-consumption of local public goods like education and safety.153
Compensation for displacement could also be provided, scaled to the
degree to which the family’s destination home differed from the
family’s preferred home along designated dimensions.
workings of portable mortgages and noting the current dearth of these alternatives in the
United States).
150 Such a model would work well with a reduced-risk form of homeownership in which
the risk associated with housing market fluctuations would be outsourced, although this
would not be an essential feature if all the homes in the system were in closely correlated
local housing markets. See infra notes 190–93 and accompanying text.
151 Solutions devised for other sorts of matching problems, such as timeshare swaps,
may be helpful in designing bidding mechanisms. See Yu Wang & Aradhna Krishna,
Timeshare Exchange Mechanisms, 52 MGMT. SCI. 1223 (2006) (proposing and
experimentally testing a matching mechanism adapted for vacation timeshares).
152 A put option entitles (but does not obligate) its holder to force her counterparty to
purchase an asset at a specified price. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 25, at 503–05
(defining call and put options).
153 I thank Lior Strahilevitz for comments on this point.

1494

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1457

A geographically scaled-up version of this model could facilitate
voluntary moves among metro areas. This too would help to serve
urban land use needs writ large by facilitating efficient shifts of human
capital. While much of this paper has focused on the need to periodically clear the slate within urban areas to enable redevelopment—and
hence on moving existing uses out of the way—it is just as important
to devise mechanisms that can support the mobility of people and
firms to the places where they can add the most value.
While such an approach is not for everyone, it would provide
more stability than many leaseholds, as well as flexibility that might be
attractive to households with uncertain job prospects or changing
family needs. And it might be especially attractive to a new generation
that is less enamored of homeownership and already comfortable navigating fluid systems like Airbnb. Finally, although it is not my focus
here, it is worth observing that natural changes such as sea-level rise
may also create pressure in the direction of shifting or mobile property interests.154 The common theme is the need for adaptation to
changing conditions, whether the product of natural or social
phenomena.
C.

Making the Switch

The ideas sketched thus far are just that, sketches—departure
points for further exploration, not fully conceived new institutional
arrangements. Retrofitting property for modern conditions is a large
project, one that I can only hope to open a dialogue about here. My
primary goal in this paper is to suggest the need for a foundational
shift in the way real property is conceptualized. Section 1 below discusses the nature of that shift. Sections 2 and 3 turn to more practical
aspects of a paradigm shift in real property’s form—transition issues,
and the interaction between limited fees and other existing and proposed approaches to land use control.

154 For example, “rolling easements” (which comprise a number of distinct legal
arrangements) are types of untethered property interests. See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf,
Strategies for Making Sea-Level Rise Adaptation Tools “Takings-Proof,” 28 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 157, 192–93 (2013) (defining and discussing rolling easements). For discussion
of the ambulatory line between public and private ownership along the shoreline, see
generally Katrina M. Wyman & Nicholas R. Williams, Migrating Boundaries, 65 FLA. L.
REV. 1957 (2013). Objective metrics such as temperature changes and sea-level rise might
also be used as trigger conditions under a callable fee structure. I thank Arden Rowell for
discussions on this point.
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1. From Enduring Things to Access Streams
Property theory is dominated by a thing-based paradigm that
emphasizes the exclusion strategy.155 The appeal of this paradigm is
undeniable: Drawing boundaries around resources and keeping interlopers out is an ingenious way to pair inputs and outcomes across a
range of settings. These are, unsurprisingly, the settings from which
exclusion theorists overwhelmingly draw their motivating examples.
Points about how property is or must be structured rely heavily on a
set of stock characters: farms, crops, herds, decontextualized singlefamily homes, and privately owned cars.156 These familiar illustrations
obscure the fact that there are important contexts in which the exclusion approach does not work well—from water rights157 to the urban
areas in which most human beings now live.158
There have been challenges to the dominant property paradigm,
but they have primarily come in the form of pushback against strong
exclusion rights.159 Both sides in the exclusion debate seem to agree
that the core of value lies inside the boundaries, and the only question
is who will be allowed to get at it. The message here is different. There
is nothing (much) of value inside property boundaries unless the right
things are happening outside those property boundaries. Assigning
people rights in physical space for a period of time remains a way of
155 The thing-based approach has been most strongly associated with the work of Henry
Smith. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5. Although Smith claims his is an outlier view among
property theorists, his conceptualization not only aligns with popular perceptions of
property but also represents the dominant theoretical starting point with which all property
theorists must contend. See Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397,
412 (2015) (“Smith describes himself as the underdog, even though he and others who
share his perspective on property are winning.”) (footnote omitted).
156 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 27, at 156–57 (discussing how a farmer who owns “the
proverbial Blackacre” can expand holdings modularly by adding more land, a tractor, a
barn, livestock and so on, and noting in passing that “[a] similar story can be told about the
factory owner, the owner of an apartment complex, and so on and so forth”); id. at 161–62
(discussing crop examples); Merrill, supra note 46, at 2071–72 (giving the “archetypical
example” of an American family farm); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 388–91 (2001)
(discussing cattle fencing, based on Robert Ellickson’s study in Shasta County); id. at
361–62 (citing and discussing Blackstone on the importance of protecting the right to reap
where one has sown); Smith, supra note 5, at 1702–06 (using examples of cars and
“Blackacre”); id. at 1720–21 (discussing the “fencing in” rule to address wandering cattle);
see also Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A Comment on Property as the
Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 133, 140 (2012) (“The Law of Things [Smith, supra
note 5] uses land and cars as paradigm cases of property.”).
157 See Claeys, supra note 156, at 140–41 (criticizing Smith’s approach for marginalizing
riparian rights).
158 See supra note 11; supra Sections II.A.1, II.B.1.
159 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 746–48 (2009) (arguing that a vision of property rights
centered around the owner’s right to exclude is “highly misleading”).
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delivering access to a consumption stream, but that stream is fed and
diverted by acts undertaken by many parties both on and off the
parcel.160 And one of the primary ways in which the consumption
stream is enriched is through property reconfiguration that enables
development at different scales.
Maintaining dominion over a physical thing in perpetuity is no
longer a particularly good way of ensuring access to the relevant
stream of payoffs over time. Just as advances in cloud-based computing have made continuity in individually owned devices less crucial
than it once was, so too may we come to understand buildings and
plots of land less as ultimate repositories of value than as mechanisms
for accessing value that resides elsewhere.161 Seeing real property as
primarily constituting “portal rights” into the surrounding urban value
creation machine, rather than as an owned patch of earth, illuminates
the real end and aim of ownership—delivering access to resources.
Some continuity of physical possession is important to that enterprise,
but how much? Something well short of eternity, I posit, can do nicely.
The mental shift I am urging here is echoed in some ways by
innovations in the so-called sharing economy.162 Access to resources,
not the ownership of things, is increasingly becoming the coin of the
realm.163 Finding functional ways to deliver that access is the overarching enterprise. The business model of an Airbnb or a Zipcar
cannot, of course, be extended in a simplistic way to all of property
ownership—continuity of possession continues to generate benefits
that cannot be replicated through finely-sliced use rights. But neither
should we neglect the lesson that traditional ownership of enduring
objects is only one way, and often not the best way, to gain access to
valuable resources.
The idea of making urban real property more flexible at its core
sets the project here apart from the many other scholarly efforts
directed at finding ways to reform eminent domain or devise replace160 Contrast this very different understanding of the returns to ownership, which is
prefaced by agricultural examples: “Property is like a profit-sharing plan in which 100% of
the profits go to the individual profit center, or an incentive compensation scheme in which
100% of the compensation is in stock options.” Merrill, supra note 27, at 162.
161 See Fennell, supra note 141, at 941–42.
162 See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an Urban
Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215, 216 n.1 (2016) (noting the contested nature
of this term).
163 See, e.g., RIFKIN, supra note 148, at 4–7 (describing and predicting shifts from
ownership to access); Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property in the Sharing
Economy, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 61, 93–94 (2015) (noting trends producing “a gradual tendency
towards access to property in preference to ownership of property”); Kellen Zale, Sharing
Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 533–35 (2016) (discussing the sharing economy’s
prioritization of access).
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ment mechanisms for it. Both eminent domain and most substitute
approaches operate as one-off disruptions superimposed on what is
viewed as a stable and enduring system of land ownership.164 By contrast, the callable and floating fee would make property holdings
foundationally more contingent, to allow for repeated reconfiguration
over time. Although motivated by some of the same concerns as other
eminent domain reform proposals, my approach sees the need to
rescale land uses over time not as episodic crises that we must weather
as best we can in our existing property vehicles, but rather as features
of the urban atmosphere that have become so pervasive and economically significant as to require restyling urban land ownership itself.165
2. Transition Issues
A primary rationale behind floating and callable fees is to ease
future transitions when the scale of efficient use changes and there is
an accompanying need to reconfigure holdings and uses. But what
about the initial transition that is required to get such a system of
limited fees started in the first place? We can, of course, simply posit a
clean slate—a set of properties that have been cleared through traditional eminent domain or that happen to be under the control of a
developer or other single owner already.166 In these contexts, it would
be possible to simply sell individual parcels subject to options. But it
would make little sense to limit floating and callable fees to these contexts. The places where reconfiguration is likely to be most valuable
going forward may very well be already developed and fragmented
among many owners. Moreover, concerns about eminent domain
form part of the rationale for using limited fees to ease
reconfiguration.
164 See Heller & Hills, supra note 14, at 1512–17 & 1514 tbl.2 (distinguishing “repeat
dealings” from “one-shot deals” and placing both eminent domain and their Land
Assembly District alternative in the latter category). Land readjustment, which I have
discussed above as a kind of floating fee, does involve long-term interactions among
neighbors and more foundationally alters the nature of property holdings. See id. at 1514
tbl.2, 1515–17.
165 For a more wide-ranging (and extreme) proposed revision of property holdings, see
Posner & Weyl, supra note 125. Their approach would require owners to value all of their
assets (not just land) and pay taxes on them accordingly, while simultaneously rendering
them constantly vulnerable to forced acquisition by anyone at the stated values. See
generally id. Their approach is similarly motivated by concerns about the costs of
ownership’s monopoly power, but differs in making individual owners’ valuations central.
See infra note 181 and accompanying text (noting how interactions among proximate but
separately owned properties make valuations interdependent).
166 See supra text accompanying note 117 (positing such a clean slate for expository
simplicity).
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Suppose, then, that a local government wished to introduce a callable or floating fee district in an existing, already developed area. To
accomplish this result, the entitlements held by each current owner
would be effectively downgraded from a fee simple to a type of defeasible fee, one subject to an option that can be exercised upon specified
conditions and within specified time windows, for specified levels of
compensation.167 Applying this change to a set of contiguous properties held by different parties would require coercion of some form,
given familiar holdout problems. Importantly, however, establishing a
new defeasible fee district would be one step removed from any actual
displacement and could provide reciprocal benefits for the affected
landowners—facts that influence both the mechanism for establishing
the defeasible fee districts and the question of whether (and how
much) compensation would be required at that time.
The decision to create callable or floating fees in a given area
need not be made by the government itself—although that would be
one possibility. For example, state legislation could prescribe a
supermajority vote to form a floating fee district.168 This approach
might be attractive where the designated community as a whole stands
to gain from the associated future flexibility. Similarly, the establishment of callable fees within a given urban core could be made contingent on supermajorities in a sufficient number of potential callblocks
agreeing to the designation.169 Such approaches would not eliminate
coercion—nothing short of a unanimity rule can do that—but they
167 The callable fee would contemplate cash compensation while the floating fee might
be characterized as providing in-kind compensation either at the time the district is
established (replacing a fixed estate with a portable one) or at the time the estate is
actually moved (replacing a holding at one physical location with another, with the
potential for side payments to even out differences in value). The existence of
compensation would ameliorate what was historically a significant problem with using
defeasible fees as land use control measures—the reluctance of lenders to accept collateral
that might be subject to forfeiture. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Defeasible Fee and the
Birth of the Modern Residential Subdivision, 49 MO. L. REV. 695, 733–34 (1984) (describing
this problem).
168 Cf. Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum
Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589, S596 (2002) (describing
compulsory unitization in the oil and natural gas context, in which a specified majority can
compel dissenters to join the unit); Nelson, supra note 61, at 834 (proposing supermajority
rule for creating new neighborhood associations in existing communities). Such approaches
would also resemble in some respects the majoritarian Land Assembly Districts proposed
in Heller & Hills, supra note 14, and land readjustment approaches conditioned on
majority landowner approval, see Hong, supra note 138, at 15. But here the vote would
concern whether to subject estates in the area to floating fees or call options in the first
place, rather than to actually carry out the relocation or exercise the call.
169 The existence of nearby callblocks that can be redeveloped under certain conditions
could confer benefits that outweigh the impact of one’s own property becoming callable.
Cf. Gay & Nasser-Ghodsi, supra note 133, at 84–93.
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would shift coercion to a different spatial scale and institutional
apparatus.
An interesting question is whether the kind of adjustment in
tenure form contemplated here would represent a compensable taking
in itself, assuming compensation would be provided at the point when
displacement actually occurs. Suppose the option to which the land is
made subject complies with the standards for the exercise of eminent
domain in the jurisdiction—that is, the strike price constitutes just
compensation170 and the conditions for calling or relocating the estate
would qualify the shift as one for public use. If so, then the options
created by a floating or callable fee would simply track the substance
of the implicit option that the power of eminent domain already
embodies. Nonetheless, the immediate change in the property’s status
would likely require some form of compensation at the point of transition, whether for doctrinal or prudential reasons.
As a first cut, landowners in the newly-designated callblock or
floating fee district might be granted put options that would allow
them to exit the area by forcing a sale of their property at fair market
value to the entity administering the callblock or floating district.171
For owners who wished to stay in place, the government could condemn an option on the property that could later be exercised in
accordance with designated protocols (including protocols for calculating the strike price). Frontloading this change in property rights—
and paying for the change—could reduce the procedural hurdles
required at the time of option exercise.172

170 The just compensation condition would be satisfied as long as at least fair market
value is provided to owners. Floating fees would characteristically provide compensation in
kind, which might raise some constitutional questions. But also granting the owner a fair
market put option would likely address compensation concerns. See Douglas T. Kendall &
James E. Ryan, “Paying” for the Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and
Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1801, 1843–44 (1995) (discussing the
constitutional status of an arrangement allowing monetary just compensation to be waived
in favor of in-kind compensation).
171 Put options might be incorporated into a more flexible system of land ownership in
other ways as well. I thank Daniel Hemel for discussions on this point.
172 In interpreting the public use requirement, the Supreme Court has emphasized the
importance of the planning process that typically accompanies condemnation decisions.
See generally Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOL. L.Q. 443 (2007).
Although it is unclear how this consideration would apply to decisionmaking that is
distributed over time through options, a more explicit and frontloaded planning process at
the time of option writing might reduce the amount of process required at the point of
option exercise. This could be an advantage if the goal is to set objective and verifiable
criteria that will entitle a private party to exercise the option if she so chooses.
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Such compensation would also help to address what might otherwise be considerable “demoralization costs.”173 Even if the substantive criteria for displacement under the new property forms tracked
the applicable legal standards for eminent domain, these new forms of
tenure could lower the political price of displacement and increase the
risk of displacement.174 Compensating for the added risk seems appropriate, although the level of compensation should take into account
the deferred and contingent nature of the displacement, as well as the
possibility that the system may deliver reciprocal benefits to affected
landowners.
An analogy might be drawn to other historical transitions that
property law has made among tenure forms, such as the elimination of
the fee tail. The fee tail came to be regarded as an obstacle to social
goals, and was ultimately done away with, even though this inevitably
truncated some interests and enlarged others.175 Converting the fee
simple to a floating or callable fee would similarly strip away the veto
rights that impede the achievement of social goals. This would curtail
the rights of owners in some respects while simultaneously granting
them greater access to the prospect of valuable reconfiguration.
3.

Connecting to Other Approaches

What would the adoption of callable or floating fees mean for
existing land use controls and proposed reforms? One possibility is
that land use controls could be loosened to permit more risk taking
and experimentation, now that there is an orderly process for revising
missteps and weeding out failures.176 To the extent that some land use
controls can be understood as prophylactic measures designed to preserve future options, their need would be obviated by explicit options
capable of addressing later concerns. For example, it is sometimes suggested that minimum lot sizes are meant to protect against excessive
spatial fragmentation, based on the idea that reassembly would be far
173 See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214–15 (1967)
(discussing demoralization costs).
174 This point is considered in depth below. See infra Section III.C.
175 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 225; Stanley N. Katz, Thomas
Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. ECON. 467, 471
(1976) (discussing Jefferson’s bill to abolish the entail in Virginia and quoting his rationale,
which included the idea that natural rights would not be diminished, but rather enlarged);
see also Posner & Weyl, supra note 125, at 53–54 (observing that the abolition of the fee
tail was apparently viewed as “constitutionally unproblematic”).
176 A more pessimistic account would focus on the new opportunities that revised tenure
forms might provide for government to extract value from private parties. But our present
system of land use already carries these risks, and it is unclear why tenure forms that
provide more opportunities for redevelopment would make matters worse.
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more difficult to accomplish at a later time.177 Keeping property in
one large tract when it is more efficiently divided into multiple pieces
preserves an option to use the property at the large-tract scale in the
future, but it also carries an opportunity cost—one that is unnecessary
if the option can be preserved in other ways.
It bears emphasis that these new tenure forms would consciously
operate to make continued patterns of possession more contingent,
replacing presumptive entrenchment with a system that periodically
reassesses the social value of existing arrangements.178 The idea is less
radical than it might seem at first. It is already the case that owners
who fall down on the job in particular ways—from failing to pay taxes
to failing to pay attention to encroachers—can lose their claims.179 In
an important sense, then, landowners do not currently hold perpetual
rights, but rather only options to renew their possessory claims upon
paying the requisite strike price at regular intervals.180 What it takes
to renew one’s claim has historically been rather limited. But as societal changes have magnified the opportunity costs at stake in urban
areas, the principle could be extended to a more robust renewal
requirement.181
177 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,
1173 (1999) (“[T]he dynamics of the one-way ratchet of fragmentation suggest another
logic for minimum lot sizes: to counteract market forces that might lead individuals to
break up land too much.”).
178 Cf. Stephen Clowney, Landscape Fairness: Removing Discrimination from the Built
Environment, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1, 58–61 (proposing subjecting “all existing monuments
and honorary spaces” to a sunset provision that would require their reevaluation).
179 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 117, at 128–38 (describing legal tools that can generate
forfeiture for failing to pay taxes or maintain the property to code); Shoked, supra note 49,
at 481–89 (discussing legal doctrines that enforce a duty to maintain through property
forfeiture); Singer, supra note 8, at 1317–18 (discussing examples of conditional property,
including adverse possession).
180 See Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse
Possession, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 1037, 1092 (2006) (casting property in terms of a renewable
option).
181 Among other things, fulfilling such a requirement would help demonstrate that
landowners value remaining in place. Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 474 (2003) (suggesting that the
bother of periodically renewing copyright and paying a small fee would weed out most
potential claimants fairly rapidly). I thank Yun-chien Chang for suggesting this parallel.
Similar in spirit are proposals that require self-assessed valuation of assets as a basis both
for taxation and forced sale. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 114; Posner & Weyl, supra note
125. My proposal here differs in that it operates at the group rather than individual level,
and thus addresses complementarities among separately owned properties that influence
their value to their respective owners. Cf. Posner & Weyl, supra note 125, at 21–22
(discussing the problem that complementarities pose for self-assessed valuation and
explaining how their system could address complementarities among goods held by the
same owner).
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Consider the effect that new tenure forms might have on smallscale private land use controls, such as systems of covenants. As
already suggested, the callable fee could induce collective action
aimed at staving off calls, and might consequently produce innovative
mechanisms for fostering and harnessing cooperative efforts. This
approach is not without risk. Private solutions can be as coercive as
public ones,182 and long-range projects with large but risky or deferred
potential payoffs may be undervalued in a system that makes continuity contingent on performance.183 But periodic reassessments at
long enough intervals could have a galvanizing effect in producing
bottom-up solutions to the collective problems of urban life: namely,
how to get parties to act in ways that will generate valuable positive
spillovers and make the most of complementarities. Here, we might
see creative adaptations of existing models for addressing resource
dilemmas that exist at a scale larger than the owner’s individual
parcel,184 from oil unitization185 to the trust186 to business improvement districts.187
Floating fees would involve a different institutional apparatus
and would provide a different set of incentives for cooperation. In
approaches modeled on land readjustment, the fact that any owner
182 See, e.g., Stephen Clowney, Rule of Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal
Property Rights, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 59, 67–98 (examining the use of violence in a variety
of informal property regimes).
183 There are obvious parallels to academic tenure and other forms of job security here.
Reevaluation (at the extreme, periodically “reinterviewing” for one’s job) may keep
incentives sharp, but these advantages must be weighed against potential demoralization
and the benefits of allowing people to engage in long-range projects without obvious nearterm payoffs. See also Singer, supra note 8, at 1317–18 (noting the value judgments
inherent in choosing whether to make continued possession of property contingent rather
than presumptive).
184 See generally Schulz & Lueck, supra note 24.
185 Oil unitization enables adjacent landowners to operate as a single decisionmaking
entity with respect to oil reserves that span their parcels. See Gary D. Libecap, Contracting
for Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 157–58
(Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003).
186 The trust developed as a way to ease interactions among holders of present and
future interests. See POSNER, supra note 34, at 75–76 (explaining that trusts enable the
grantor to “split the beneficial interest as many ways as he pleases without worrying about
divided ownership”). A trustee holds legal title in the full fee simple interest while
beneficiaries of the trust hold equitable versions of standard property interests, such as life
estates and remainders. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 295–97.
187 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement
Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365 (1999). Business improvement
districts (BIDs) allow proximate owners to impose taxes on themselves and to spend the
revenues pursuing shared goals. However, they do not have a formalized system in place
for splitting up the benefits that are thereby realized. Robert Ellickson has proposed a
smaller-scale variation: block-level improvement districts (BLIDs). Robert C. Ellickson,
New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75 (1998).
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might later end up in another spatial position within the community
gives everyone at least a limited stake in the fate of all portions of the
community. This is a synthetic entwining of ownership interests that
replicates in some measure the scattered strips of the semicommons,
which similarly blurred ownership lines and helped to align incentives.188 Other opportunities for both cooperation and conflict would
arise for floating fee owners when land is reallocated. Finding an
appropriate algorithm for collecting and prioritizing preferences is no
easy matter, as disputes over mundane types of portable claims—
office space in a new building, for example—attest.189 At the same
time, however, the floating fee could provide a platform for collaboration directed at maximizing the joint returns from a given
reconfiguration.
Finally, callable or floating fees might interact in interesting ways
with other land use innovations that have been discussed in recent
years. To take one example that I have focused on in previous work, a
shared equity or reduced-risk form of homeownership might mesh
well with a callable or floating fee if the latter structures offered more
predictable time windows for settling up with investors over gains and
losses.190 One of the difficulties associated with offloading housing
market risk onto investors is that the expected returns depend on how
long the owner holds onto the property—and this is unpredictable.191
If property became vulnerable to calls or reconfigurations at predictable intervals, those intervals could provide natural points for payouts
to investors (if area home values have gone up) or payments to homeowners (if area home values have gone down).
The potential for a new homeownership form to buffer investment losses and truncate investment gains also bears on incentives
surrounding the exercise of calls or reconfigurations, with the specific
effects depending on the design features and compensation protocols
188 See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000). A similar approach, which might be used more broadly,
would synthetically interlock the holdings of individual owners through the use of
derivative instruments keyed to neighboring owners’ property values, stock prices, or other
economic variables. Again, the goal would be to make each owner share to a greater extent
in the fortunes of her neighbors.
189 RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
270–76 (2015) (describing the office-allocation difficulties associated with the University of
Chicago Booth School of Business’s move to a new building).
190 For background on existing models, see Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102
NW. U.L. REV. 1047, 1063–70 (2008) and sources cited therein.
191 See, e.g., Andrew Caplin et al., Shared-Equity Mortgages, Housing Affordability, and
Homeownership, 18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 209, 219 (2007) (“The long and
unpredictable nature of the payoff period appears to have been the chief reason that the
Bank of Scotland withdrew its shared-equity mortgages from the market.”).
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in place. A combination of investment protection against market fluctuations and incentives to meet governmentally established metrics in
order to retain possession could work an interesting change in the way
that people think about ownership. These changes might, for example,
invert NIMBYism.192 In place of risk-averse homeowners who reflexively fight all change to protect resale values, a new style of owners
might be willing to take positive expected-value bets with respect to
development in order to earn the right to remain.193
III
OBJECTIONS
Any suggested change in existing property forms might be
expected to produce strong resistance. Property is an inherently conservative institution that is designed to entrench claims and protect
expectations, not upend them. Yet property cannot work without
some degree of dynamism.194 Property thus illustrates well Lon
Fuller’s point that a foundational social design challenge is “that of
maintaining a balance between supporting structure and adaptive fluidity.”195 The premise of this paper is that our existing property forms
are long on supportive structure but too short on adaptive fluidity,
and that recalibration is warranted.
This Part anticipates several objections. I start by addressing the
standard question of how any idea can be a good one if it has not
already been implemented. I then turn to a set of theoretical concerns
associated with altering property forms in the ways suggested here,
including the worry that the resulting arrangements are too weak to
count as property or run afoul of the numerus clausus principle.
Finally, I consider a primary normative objection to making property
less rooted or permanent—that it will result in harmful forms of displacement and associated identity loss for people and communities.
192 NIMBY stands for “not in my back yard” and is often used to capture (or critique)
the sentiments of homeowners who oppose nearby development. See, e.g., WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 9–10 (2001).
193 Such a result would fit with behavioral findings suggesting that people are loss averse
rather than uniformly risk averse, and more willing to take risks to avoid a result that
would be framed as a loss than to obtain a result that would be framed as a gain. See
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341,
342–43 (1984).
194 See FULLER, supra note 56, at 28 (describing the tension between stability and
dynamism in contract and property, in which too little stability presents the risk that
“exchange would lose its anchorage,” while too much rigidity means that “society’s effort
to direct its resources toward their most effective use is frustrated by a system of vested
personal and institutional interests”).
195 Id. at 29.
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A. Why Don’t We See It?
A standard response to any proposed innovation in property (or
any other area of the law) runs like this: If this were such a good idea,
wouldn’t private parties already be clamoring to adopt it on their
own? Doesn’t the fact that we don’t observe it in the real world establish its lack of value?
As an initial matter, it is worth reiterating that we do see models
that involve time-limited or floating estates already, both in the U.S.
and in other countries—from vacation timeshares to retirement
homes to land readjustment to all manner of usufructs.196 Eminent
domain equates to a call option on property as well, if a much
maligned one. The question, then, is not whether there is demand for
these kinds of alternatives—clearly there is—but rather why private
innovation has not produced more comprehensive versions of them
that could generate solutions to urban land use challenges. There are
at least three reasons we might see this shortfall, other than intrinsic
lack of merit.
First, private parties may have difficulty introducing a new way of
holding property without the imprimatur of government. It is not just
a matter of getting potential buyers to accept the new variation, but
also lenders and loan guarantors who effectively control buyers’
access to real estate. The way that new property forms will be treated
by regulatory and taxing entities may also be unclear, generating more
reasons for caution. By addressing such hurdles, the government can
engage in what Josh Lerner has termed “table-setting”—fostering an
environment in which entrepreneurial efforts can thrive.197
Second, the options retained by private parties would be close to
valueless unless the local government was willing to approve—and
commit itself in advance to approving—the larger-scale projects that
would be made possible by the options’ exercise. Likewise, the private
party would be gambling on the government not undertaking some
protective measure that would prevent exercise of the options against
the current wishes of the possessory owners.198
196 See, e.g., Alain-Laurent Verbeke et al., The Many Faces of Usufruct, in TIMELIMITED INTERESTS IN LAND, supra note 109, at 33; see also supra notes 142–44 and
accompanying text (discussing other examples of time-limited interests).
197 JOSH LERNER, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS 89–110 (2009).
198 Such a move to eliminate bargained-for value might or might not amount to a
compensable taking. Compare Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), with Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (reaching different results
when statutes regulating coal mining effectively eliminated the value associated with the
“support estate” recognized by Pennsylvania law).
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Third, some of the places where callable and floating fees would
be most valuable are places in which ownership is presently dispersed
among many owners. Government involvement would likely be necessary to consolidate ownership in such places before a private party
would be in a position to experiment with the approaches discussed
here. But a developer would be unlikely to win that form of government intervention based on a possible future development project that
the developer now only wishes to amass options on exercising.
To be sure, these points only cast doubt on the claim that the
nonexistence of these property forms indicates their lack of value.
They do not establish the opposite proposition: that positive value
could be derived from these innovations. And one might wonder
whether these arguments prove too much. If it is really the case that
uncertainty about future government actions helps to explain private
reluctance to initiate these forms, wouldn’t the same uncertainty
operate to quash private participation even under a governmentsponsored system of callable or floating fees? Because the government cannot legally bind itself not to act in certain ways in the future,
what would keep it from bowing to political pressure and unwinding
the limited fees (to the detriment of the option holders) once the possessory owners had ensconced themselves in their properties?199
There are a couple of responses. For one thing, granting actual
property interests to third parties is a form of precommitment that is
harder to undo, at least to the extent that it creates interests that, if
eliminated, would be compensable takings.200 A better answer is that
a government that plans ahead to create these limited fees is likely to
face lower political barriers in allowing the already conveyed interests
to play out as planned than it would in initiating eminent domain
anew. This does not mean that local governments might not unwind
these interests under some circumstances, only that the ability to facilitate economic redevelopment through inaction could be a valuable
asset for governmental entities faced with increasing economic pressures. Moreover, local governments would be in a position to incentivize initial developer participation in these approaches, generating

199 Cf. Donald Clarke, China’s Stealth Urban Land Revolution, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 323,
352–58 (2014) (assessing the potential for political action to turn time-limited, renewable
urban land use rights in China into perpetual ones).
200 For discussion of the ways in which governments entrench policies through the use of
property rights, see Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law:
Binding Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 897–905 (2011). Interestingly, the
entrenchment in this case would be in the service of an anti-entrenchment goal—enabling
reconfiguration of property interests.
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momentum and credibility for the approach in a way that would be
difficult to replicate privately.
More broadly, the problems that I identify with existing property
forms are not amenable to ordinary market solutions. For one thing,
land use markets are not ordinary markets; instead, they are highly
regulated arenas in which the rights to engage in uses are not objects
of commerce but rather the subjects of complex political negotiations.
Equally significant, the turnover in individual neighboring properties
is not synchronized in a way that would enable large-scale changes in
use. Land assembly can be accomplished through eminent domain,
but eminent domain is not a market solution.
Of course, private parties can attempt to amass large assemblages
of land on their own, using buying agents and the like to get around
holdout problems.201 But even when this strategy is successful, it concentrates ownership in a way that can generate normative concerns.
And there can be inefficiencies associated with consolidating ownership for all purposes at a scale much larger than that which is best
suited to the ordinary value-generating activities taking place on the
property. Doing so solves one set of problems (managing the coordination among separate owners) at the cost of introducing another set
of problems (managing the internal interactions among different
agents, such as employees or tenants).202
What is unique about the approach here, and what requires the
coordinating involvement of government, is the possibility of repeatedly assembling and reassembling the most valuable complementary
land uses—without the need to continually maintain the entire operation under a single owner’s control.
B.

Property Gone Wrong?

The next set of objections sounds in property theory and asks
whether the approaches suggested here would move us away from
what property is foundationally meant to be and do. First, I address
the question of whether the limited estates discussed here would
fatally weaken property. Second, I consider whether the numerus
clausus principle ought to be regarded as an impediment to these sorts
of innovations.
201 See Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18–24
(2006).
202 See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
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1. Too Weak?
The analysis above explained why a tenure form that moved away
from the fee simple’s particular architecture would not cease to be
property. But would such a form of property be too weak to be attractive to anyone? To answer the question, we must compare the new
estate not to an idealized version of property but to the fee simple as
it operates on the ground and as it might be adapted to urban conditions going forward.
In terms of protecting the option to stay in place, the stalwart fee
simple is only as strong as the current political resistance to the application of eminent domain.203 We do not have a property form that
guarantees the right to stay in place forever.204 Yet even a strong right
to stay in the same physical location indefinitely does little to protect
what gives property most of its value—its position relative to other
uses. What will happen (or fail to happen) nearby remains a gamble,
no matter how strong the right to remain.205 Property rights may well
be more valuable in a system that is good at putting complementary
uses together, even at some displacement risk.206
Remaking the tenure form may also give the average citizen
property rights that are stronger than she would be likely to enjoy
under alternative models. For example, expanding the scope of holdings under one owner’s control can harness synergies among uses
without upending the fee simple.207 But such approaches rely on con203 This statement assumes that politics, not constitutional doctrine, provides the binding
constraint against the use of eminent domain to reconfigure property in urban areas. See
supra note 116 and accompanying text.
204 It might seem that owners who keep their properties in high-value uses would be
largely immune to eminent domain. This might be generally true as a political matter, but it
remains contingent for that same reason. Even if we assume that condemning authorities
can unfailingly recognize and protect efficient uses on the merits, the fact that a given
owner’s use is high-value for the current parcel size does not mean that another use at a
different scale might not generate more value. Similarly, even if the owner’s current use is
optimal, it might be embedded within an area that contains many suboptimal uses; eminent
domain might target the area as a whole. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)
(holding that a nonblighted store can be condemned along with blighted neighboring
properties in order to redevelop the entire area).
205 See STRETTON, supra note 12, at 39 (explaining that within large, complex cities, the
location choice of a firm or household “consists chiefly in guessing at other people’s future
locational and investment decisions” and is thus “chiefly a gamble on other people’s
externalities”).
206 Cf. Zhao, supra note 129, at 5, 31–32 (observing that a land reallocation system that
provides less security of tenure may nonetheless serve social insurance and distributive
functions).
207 For instance, Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman have proposed an
approach modeled on the one that shopping malls use to manage asymmetric spillovers
among anchor stores and smaller stores, which is premised on bringing a block of uses
under single ownership. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 71; see also Fennell,
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solidating ownership in a smaller number of hands. Most economic
actors—that is, all those operating within the large envelope of the
single entity’s control—would hold diminished property interests,
such as leaseholds. And, not incidentally, achieving this consolidated
property form is likely to require some form of coercion—presumably
eminent domain. Both leaseholds and eminent domain temporally
truncate property interests just as surely as would a fee interest that
expressly builds in that possibility.
Indeed, introducing limited tenure forms may be in some cases a
less invasive and more owner-protective move than applying more
coercion to an (ostensibly) fuller set of ownership rights. By clearly
laying out expectations, limited tenure forms align more closely with
urban realities. They thereby avoid the sort of jarring disconnect that
eminent domain produces between the rhetoric of unlimited property
ownership and the reality of coercive reconfiguration.
We might also understand limited fees as changing the nature of
coercion associated with private property.208 What makes property
coercive is not only the state-backed enforcement of exclusion from
an individual owner’s premises but property’s capacity to thwart
larger-scale projects by granting holdouts a veto power. A floating or
callable fee can indeed have the effect of coercively pushing individual
owners out of the way of larger projects, but it also frees owners as a
group from the coercion of individual owners. For similar reasons, we
would not say that a unanimity requirement is an inherently less coercive way to make decisions than a simple majority or supermajority
requirement. It is more protective of the status quo, to be sure, but it
grants tremendous power to each individual voter to lock the status
quo in place.209
2. Too Fancy?
No discussion of altered tenure forms can avoid confronting the
supposed barrier of the numerus clausus doctrine—the idea that property should come in just a few standardized forms. Thomas Merrill
supra note 45, at 1401–05 (discussing and critiquing Parchomovksy & Siegelman’s
approach).
208 As Eric Freyfogle has observed, a system of private property represents a form of
mutual coercion. Eric T. Freyfogle, A Good that Transcends: Culture Change and Our
Common Home, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1415, 1424 (2015) (“[T]he private-property approach
[to the tragedy of the commons] is merely a form of mutual coercion mutually agreed
upon, and not necessarily much different from overtly regulatory approaches.”).
209 For a classic discussion of the costs and benefits of different voting rules, see JAMES
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 68–72 (1962)
(examining the tradeoffs between decision costs and the costs of a decision adverse to
one’s interests as the threshold for decisionmaking changes).
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and Henry Smith famously argued that a limited property menu keeps
information costs low for all those who wish to transact over, or even
just avoid encroaching on, property.210 By contrast, allowing idiosyncratic or “fancy” property interests will sow confusion, causing information costs to skyrocket.211 Should a callable or floating fee be
rejected for this reason?
There are two reasons for a negative answer, even if we assume
the merits of the information-cost arguments in favor of a limited
menu of property forms. First, Merrill and Smith’s approach seeks
“optimal” standardization, not maximum standardization.212 The
asserted benefits flowing from a fixed and limited tenure menu do not
require that the menu be limited (for all practical purposes) to only
one form, much less that this form equate to the fee simple.
Second, the callable and floating fee can be constructed without
adding materially to the existing property menu. The kinds of changes
proposed in this paper could be readily accomplished using varieties
of defeasible estates and executory interests—familiar entries in the
current list of property forms. For reasons similar to those that led to
legislation concerning common interest communities and conservation
easements, however, it would be advisable to legislatively define these
new property forms and give them standardized characteristics and
terminology.
It is here that we see the more important point that might be
taken from the numerus clausus principle: the significance of providing a recognizable, standardized form when introducing a novel
type of property. Not only does a standard template allow people to
understand what they are getting into, it also provides an anchor point
for law and policy to coalesce around.213 Conversely, a lack of consistency in terminology and operational detail can produce confusion
and impair uptake.214 None of this counsels against property innovations, but it does suggest that care should go into the way in which
new forms are introduced.
210 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
211 See id. at 26–34.
212 See id. at 38–42.
213 See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1597, 1601–03, 1644–50 (2008) (arguing that limited property forms serve as
regulatory platforms).
214 See, e.g., Ray W. Archer, Land Pooling by Local Government for Planned Urban
Development in Perth, in LAND READJUSTMENT 29, 39 (William A. Doebele ed., 1982)
(suggesting that such problems may explain in part why Perth’s experiments in land
pooling failed to thrive).
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C. Displacement and Identity Loss
A primary concern with recognizing explicitly callable or floating
fees is that these tenure forms would lead to more involuntary displacement. I have written elsewhere about the significance of the possessory option—the right to remain in place if one so chooses.215
There is no way to extend an option to other parties to end or change
a household’s or firm’s tenure without at the same time curtailing the
possessory option that the owner herself holds. The issue is not just
one of individual owners being displaced, though that is a large concern. Facilitating or accelerating change within a community also
presents risks to that community’s collective sense of identity, which is
shared among its residents.
There are at least two distinct ways that the new tenure forms
sketched here might interact with questions of displacement and identity. First, we might wonder if these potential effects would make
floating or callable fees political nonstarters—either doomed from the
beginning or subject to being unwound once they are underway.216
Second is the possibility that these property forms would heighten the
vulnerability of the least politically powerful groups to forced displacement. The concern here would not be that these new property
forms would prove politically impossible, but rather that they would
prove all too politically possible—with unwanted results.
I will start by dispensing with two arguments that might seem to
moot concerns about displacement. First is the claim that displacement concerns disappear when parties voluntarily opt into a given
tenure form, as where a currently undeveloped area is newly developed subject to the limited fee. As with other “opt in” arrangements
like common interest communities, we may wonder whether parties
fully recognize what they are getting into, and ask how voluntary a
choice really is if all of the available housing stock within the most
desirable areas comes with this proviso.217 This concern is sharpened if
the pricing of homes in different areas builds in displacement risks, as
it presumably would, since lower-income people may face a constrained choice set. While the opportunity to opt into different tenure
forms does make a normative difference, as I will explain, it does not
provide a complete answer to concerns about displacement.
215 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Options for Owners and Outlaws, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER
PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 239, 244–47 (2012).
216 This point was addressed in a general way above. See supra text accompanying notes
199–200. The severity of the underlying displacement concerns, considered in this section,
may bear on the likelihood of these political impediments.
217 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829,
876–82.
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Nor is the observation that everyone is already holding a callable
fee by virtue of their vulnerability to eminent domain a complete
answer. While it is relevant that vulnerability to displacement does
already exist, we cannot ignore the possibility that the introduction of
more limited estates would alter the character or distribution of that
vulnerability in potentially unwanted ways. Offering expressly callable
or floating fees could also sidestep the political resistance associated
with the exercise of eminent domain, which might lead to displacement occurring with greater frequency.218 It would be inaccurate to
suggest that this would introduce no disadvantages relative to eminent
domain for anyone.
We must, therefore, take displacement concerns seriously, both as
a potential threat to the viability of tenure innovations and as a potential normative objection to their success. Here it becomes relevant
that leaseholds that provide little to no long-term tenure protection
are common in most U.S. jurisdictions. Most residential leaseholds are
for one year or less, and the landlord typically has the right to raise
the rent or withdraw the unit at the end of the lease term, with either
action carrying the potential to displace the tenant. Compared with
these typical leaseholds, a callable or floating fee would appear to add
tenure protection rather than erode it. To the extent that these new
tenure forms made ownership more affordable, they could shift
households from the relatively less secure tenure form of leasing to a
relatively more secure tenure form.
Significantly, however, some jurisdictions do tightly control the
displacement of leaseholders through rent control and similar measures. In such places, it is not only the fee simple that can block reconfiguration, but also the veto power that is assigned to tenants who are
given a statutory right to remain indefinitely.219 Introducing a callable
or floating fee into jurisdictions where such rights exist would curtail
not only the rights of affected landlords but also those of their
tenants.220 Such a result might seem either politically untenable (given
218 Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Direct Voting by Property Owners, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 275,
304–06 (2010) (observing that the Land Assembly District mechanism proposed in Heller
& Hills, supra note 14, might approve redevelopment projects that would be rejected on a
broader community vote by property owners).
219 This right is, of course, subject to eminent domain, but the political limits on that
course of action may remove much of the associated threat.
220 Absent an exception or override, curtailment of the landlord’s estate limits the
prospective tenant’s estate as well; the landlord cannot lease out an interest greater than
that which she herself holds. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, The Elements of Possession, in LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 65, 91 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015) (describing the rule of
nemo dat quod non habet, which holds that “one cannot give that which one does not
have”).
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the political equilibrium that has already produced such strong tenant
protections) or normatively suspect (because it would seem to unambiguously downgrade rather than upgrade the prevailing level of
tenure protection in the jurisdiction).
But the downgrading of tenure protection may not be as unambiguous as it seems. If the status quo protections for existing tenants
also tend to restrict the supply of affordable housing in these jurisdictions, people may be either pushed out of the jurisdiction or into less
secure arrangements (homelessness, staying with family and friends,
and so on). The capacity to reconfigure and repurpose property, possibly at higher densities, could add to the overall housing stock for
both tenants and buyers. Instead of maximally protecting a subset of
those who desire housing in the area and offering nothing to the balance, a larger slate of housing choice might be available to greater
numbers of households.
Regardless of the empirical reality or the relative normative
weighting given to the interests of current and potential tenants,221 the
political forces generating tenant protections might nonetheless block
any property innovation that would have the effect of reducing protections for tenants. An interesting question, then, is how and whether
flexible tenure arrangements could accommodate strong demands for
tenure security. One possibility would be to designate certain portions
of an urban area for long-term residency while designating other areas
for callable or floating fees. The result might be valuable sorting into
more and less permanent forms of property—just as investors can
elect callable or call-protected financial instruments. Even if more dispossessions occurred under this approach, they might be channeled
toward those who are least bothered by them.222
Troublingly, however, such approaches might also seem to
channel dispossession toward those who are least able to pay the premium for permanence. But this need not be the case. Call-protected
tenancies might offer one way of distributing permanence to those
who gain the most from it, whether or not they can pay for it. Callable
or floating fees might also be spatially distributed in ways that would
address equity concerns. It cannot be ignored in this discussion that
221 See Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350,
355–71 (1986) (discussing arguments for favoring tenants already present in the community
through rent control).
222 Governments may already attempt to steer eminent domain away from those who
will suffer the most, at least if they are politically well-organized. See Nicole Stelle Garnett,
The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 110–21
(2006) (examining successful efforts to get proposed expressways in Chicago rerouted to
avoid demolishing Catholic churches). But the callable fee would channel redevelopment
more consistently and openly.
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under the status quo, low-income people are generally more vulnerable to eminent domain, more likely to occupy leaseholds rather than
freeholds, and at greater risk of foreclosure. Simply making that vulnerability to displacement more transparent, as the callable and
floating fees would do, would make it more politically salient and
more amenable to being addressed directly through law and policy.223
A related concern is that these new tenure forms would undervalue and disrupt the deep connections that people form with land.224
There are several responses. First, if people are heterogeneous in their
connections to land, they may be able to self-sort into more or less
rooted and endless estates. Second, some versions of the floating fee
could actually increase the security with which people would remain
members of the same community, even if not occupying precisely the
same physical footprint.225 Third, it is an open normative question
whether society ought to encourage people to make large emotional
investments in remaining in precisely the same physical location over
time.226 People’s willingness to move for new job opportunities, for
example, can be economically valuable. Absolute immobility may no
longer even serve as a particularly good proxy for the important goals
of maintaining ties to family and social support networks.
Some degree of disruption may, indeed, be generative in breaking
up existing patterns and enabling more inclusive and vibrant communities. Stability looks less attractive as a normative value when one
realizes its role in perpetuating existing residential patterns, including
segregation. Drawing floating fee zones that straddle boundary lines
between racially identifiable neighborhoods, for example, might shake
up ordinary metrics of housing search and produce greater prospects
223 This might, for example, be an area in which the disparate impact cause of action
under the Fair Housing Act could offer traction. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs
v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (recognizing a disparate impact
cause of action in the Fair Housing Act).
224 For an illuminating discussion of the connections between property and memory, see
generally Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property’s Memories, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1071 (2011).
See also RIFKIN, supra note 163, at 130–33 (discussing potential effects of living
arrangements on rootedness, identity, and “embeddedness”).
225 This raises the issue of the scale at which rootedness should be assessed. See YI-FU
TUAN, SPACE AND PLACE 149–60 (1977) (emphasizing the role of scale in determining the
meaning of one’s “homeland”); id. at 182 (“For nomads the cyclical exigencies of life yield
a sense of place at two scales: the camps and the far larger territory within which they
move.”).
226 The extent to which law and policy can shape people’s expectations surrounding
property has been the subject of some recent empirical work. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy
Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449, 466–84 (2010)
(presenting and discussing experimental results suggesting that people’s perceptions of
property rights depend on the way in which those rights are framed).
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for integration.227 Callable fees could likewise offer controlled opportunities to introduce perturbations in existing housing and land use
arrangements, which could powerfully disrupt self-reinforcing
patterns.228
Fostering an enduring sense of identity with particular places
does require that the built environment exhibit some degree of stability over time.229 The costs of disposable property are evident.230 But
keeping too much of the past in place also imposes costs—including
stifling creativity. In discussing historic preservation, Yi-Fu Tuan
offers the arresting metaphor of an individual who must decide what
to keep and what to throw away to survive in what threatens to
become an increasingly cluttered home.231 Along similar lines,
Edward Glaeser has suggested placing a budget on the number of
properties that can be historically preserved, which would keep a
stable fraction of the city open to redesign and redevelopment.232
Regardless of the tenure forms that communities choose to
employ, they cannot avoid confronting issues of urban permanence
and change. Heterogeneity in tenure alternatives offers one way to
manage that tension. Like museums that employ a mix of permanent
and temporary exhibits, cities might designate areas for more frequent
227 See Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing, 97 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2762026 (examining discrimination by homeseekers, which
entrenches residential segregation, and discussing ways to counter it); cf. Aaron J. Saiger,
Local Government Without Tiebout, 41 URB. LAW. 93 (2009) (proposing periodic
redrawing of local government boundaries to thwart efforts to sort into exclusive, wealthstratified communities). I am grateful to Angela Onwuachi-Willig for raising this point and
to Paul Gowder for discussion.
228 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 227 (examining the potential for random variation to
disrupt segregative patterns); Richard R.W. Brooks, The Banality of Racial Inequality, 124
YALE L.J. 2626, 2655–61 (2015) (reviewing DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM
(2014)) (describing the path dependence illustrated by the Pólya urn model and explaining
how introducing random variation into urn-filling protocols could break entrenched
patterns); cf. Ken Kollman et al., Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model, 87
AM. ECON. REV. 977, 989 (1997) (describing how the introduction of random policy
mutations in a multijurisdictional model can facilitate a shift from a less valuable local
optimum to a more valuable overall configuration).
229 TUAN, supra note 225, at 159 (discussing the significance of landmarks as “visible
signs [that] serve to enhance a people’s sense of identity; they encourage awareness of and
loyalty to place”).
230 See, e.g., Elisabeth Braw, Japan’s Disposable Home Culture Is an Environmental and
Financial Headache, THE GUARDIAN (May 2, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
sustainable-business/disposable-homes-japan-environment-lifespan-sustainability
(describing problems arising out of a culture of building homes to be destroyed in less than
thirty years). I thank David Schleicher for alerting me to this example.
231 TUAN, supra note 225, at 196–97.
232 See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 162 (2011) (suggesting that “in a city
like New York, the landmarks commission should have a fixed number of buildings,
perhaps five thousand, that it may protect”).
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remaking or relative permanence.233 Doing so would offer a more
flexible alternative than a hard cap on the number of historic buildings, and one that would recognize complementarities among adjacent
properties.234
CONCLUSION
For centuries, the fee simple powerfully aligned incentives by
extending perpetual dominion over a specified physical domain. It
proved versatile enough to maintain its dominant position even as
social and economic conditions changed in profound ways. But a perpetual temporal reach tied to specific geographic coordinates has
shifted over time from a core source of value to a real liability in
urban areas. It is time to rethink what we want from estates in land
and to ask whether the fee simple can still deliver it.
What is needed now are property forms that can cope with the
spatial interdependence that characterizes life in and around cities.
This paper has attempted to convince readers of this fact. I have suggested some directions in which property might develop if we could
escape the gravitational pull of the fee simple, but the discussion here
has been intentionally short on operational detail. I do not purport to
have hit upon the best way, or ways, to revise tenure forms for the
city. What I hope to have done instead is put on the agenda—or at
least on the table for debate—the idea of revising some of the most
foundational attributes of the fee simple.
Property is a human invention,235 and one that we must reinvent
as conditions change. It is no longer enough for the law to protect an
owner’s domain and forestall overt land use conflicts, when the opportunity cost of failing to put together complementary uses in valuable
patterns looms ever larger. We must loosen the grip of the rooted,
everlasting estate on our imaginations if we want to build cities that
are flexible enough to flourish.

233 Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget,” 62
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81 (2011) (proposing that limits on growth implemented within a
city be offset by increased rights to build elsewhere in the city).
234 See Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of
Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 507–08 (1981) (discussing Maher v. City of
New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), and its recognition of the interest in preserving
a whole historic district—“le tout ensemble”).
235 See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human
values.”); C.B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 121 (1973) (“As an institution,
property—and any particular system of property—is a man-made device which establishes
certain relations between people.”).

